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1INTRODUCTION
Linda Flower, in "Cognition, Context, and Theory Building," calls
for a better approach to communication than what is currently being
taught in the composition classroom;
We need, I believe, a far more integrated theoretical vision
which can explain how context cues cognition, which in its
turn mediates and interprets the particular world that con
text provides.... CWle might build such a vision by using
what we have learned from arguments which problematize or
reify this conflict but by also taking a step beyond them.
(282)
This "conflict" between context and cognition—between the shifting
variables of rhetorical situations and the set ways in which people
reason and think—is perhaps at the very core of our inability as
rhetoricians and teachers to devise a more standardized curriculum
for the basic freshman rhetoric/composition course. Twenty freshman
rhetoric teachers in the same department are likely to design twenty
significantly different syllabi; and, while I do not wish to eliminate
diversity and professorial license—in fact, such flexibility is one of
our greatest assets—I must question the very existence of the disci
pline of rhetorical writing pedagogy without at least a modicum of
curricular standards. As it stands now, freshman rhetoric is being
taught with a wide range of emphases: from formal logic to sophistry
to Aristotelian philosophy to an emphasis on style to modern rhetori
cal theories and so forth. Clearly, there must be some way to firm
up the nebulous nature of most composition courses.
One approach that has proven to be popular in recent decades is
a return to a more classical pedagogy. It is often said that such
figures as Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, and Cicero established all that
we need to know about rhetoric, and that Quintilian set down all that
we need to know about teaching it. E.P.J. Corbett seems to be at the
front of this school of thought; his Classical Rhetoric for the Modern
Student (now in its third edition) has been one of the most popular
freshman rhetoric texts since 1965. However, the classical approach
has its drawbacks. For one, very few composition teachers have the
classical background necessary to use Corbett's text, much less teach
a classical composition course. For another, the rhetoric of Aristotle—
by far the most influential of the classical approaches—is too obscure
for effective teaching. Scholars have been arguing over Aristotle's
rhetorical terms, rhetorical devices, and rhetorical philosophy for two
thousand years now. Aristotle himself seems fundamentally confused
in certain sections of his Rhetoric, and he does not provide clear
instructions for those who would use his treatise as a kind of rhetoric
textbook.
In his essay,-"Enthymemes, Examples, and Rhetorical Method,"
James C. Raymond suggests that the absence of a consensus among
scholars about the meanings of rhetorical terms accounts for the lack
attention given to classical rhetoric in the modern composition
classroom (150). Currently, rhetoricians are waging a critical war
in the scholarly journals over one of these terms: the enthymeme of
Aristotle. Long dismissed as merely an abbreviated syllogism, the
enthymeme has been revived in recent years by a series of rhetorical
scholars who are redefining the term in light of Aristotle's overall
rhetoric. But we still have not arrived at a canonical definition of
the term within the discipline of rhetoric; as a result, the enthymeme
is still missing from composition ' textbooks, and teachers and students
alike are missing out on its great potential to enhance the freshman
rhetoric writing course.
Another popular approach is the movement toward modern rhetor
ical theorists, such as Kenneth Burke, I.A. Richards, Chaim Perelman,
and Stephen Toulmin. In combining basic, classical rhetorical con
cepts with recent advances in semantics, cognitive psychology, and
behavioral sciences, many composition teachers see this modern school
as more applicable and relevant to the needs of today's students. I
have been featuring Toulmin's rhetoric in my curriculum, but the big
problem facing Toulmin as well as the others is that it is not yet
clear how these modern theorists fit into the rhetorical tradition. For
example, Toulmin is a philosopher, not a rhetorician; and his ideas
about rhetoric were only formulated to answer philosophical problems.
As with Aristotle's enthymeme, the rhetoric of Stephen Toulmin,
especially his model of argumentation, is also conspicuously missing
from many composition textbooks, and most writing teachers seem
unaware of his ideas as well. As with the enthymeme, some critics
have dismissed his model as a syllogism turned on its side, and a
host of others have failed to see the potential of his rhetoric for a
variety of reasons. As a composition teacher at Iowa State University,
I have been using the Toulmin model in my classroom with substantial
success. Many of my colleagues have asked me to present a guest
lecture to their students on the nuts and bolts of the Toulmin model,
but still the model has not gained wide acceptance from most rhetori
cians and composition teachers--here or most anywhere else.
With these problems in mind, this thesis will attempt to achieve
three main objectives:
1) To characterize (not define) the enthymeme according to
its characteristic, not necessary, features. Based on the Rhetoric
of Aristotle, recent published research on the enthymeme, and my
own ideas on the matter, I will attempt to end the gridlock that
has kept the enthymeme in obscurity by devising a conception o£
the term that addresses its wide range of features and is broad
enough to remain consistent with its persuasive function.
2) To place Stephen Toulmin within the rhetorical tradition
by demonstrating that his "rhetoric" is actually an update of
Aristotle and by establishing his model as a reconceptualization
of, and modern expansion on, Aristotle's enthymeme. By using
Toulmin's primary writings, critical articles by rhetoricians and,
again, my own ideas, I will attempt to show how this new con
ception of the enthymeme unlocks the positive potential of the
Toulmin model.
3) To present the wide range of pedagogical options and
benefits that result from these new ways of looking at Aristotle's
enthymeme and Toulmin's model. By calling on pedagogy scholars
and my own store of teaching experience, I will attempt to show
that the enthymeme and the Toulmin model, taken together, can
be combined into a major theoretical component for the contempor
ary rhetoric-based composition classroom, thus providing that
integrated theoretical vision" which today's composition courses
so desperately need.
To achieve the first objective, I will attempt to explain why the
enthymeme has been so difficult to define, show how it fits into the
overall rhetoric of Aristotle, and arrive at a broad and multiplex
understanding of the term. I will look at the form versus function
dilemma by examining the differences between the enthymeme and the
syllogism. Then I will examine the relationship between the "deduc
tive enthymeme" and the "inductive example." Next, I will look at
the sources of enthymemes by turning to a discussion of the topics
and the contingencies of context. Finally, I will investigate the
role played by the audience in a discussion of the speaker-audience
"dialectic" and how the artistic appeals of the pisteis grow out of
this conversation.
To achieve my second goal of showing how Toulmin's model of
argumentation is enthymemic in nature, I will take a brief look at
Stephen Toulmin's philosophical and epistemological ideas and a more
detailed look at his "informal logic," all of which is prerequisite to
an understanding of the model itself. Then I will detail Toulmin's
method for the social justification of claims, an approach that finds
its basis in social constructionism. Next, I will turn to Toulmin's
argument fields," which attempt to describe how contextual variations
change the process of claims justification. Finally, as with the pre
vious chapter, I will explore the role of the audience and demon
strate that Toulmin's is an audience-sensitive rhetoric, one which can
incorporate all three types of artistic appeals.
The final chapter will attempt to relate some of the many poten
tial options and benefits the enthymeme and the Toulmin model can
provide the composition classroom. I will look at the enthymeme and
Toulmin's model as a unified theoretical component which can serve as
an evaluative framework, as an invention heuristic, as an organiza
tional device, and as a diagnostic tool. I will then turn to the
current rhetoric-based, composition textbooks to see how text writers
are presenting the enthymeme and the Toulmin model to their student
readers. And lastly, I will offer some of my own suggestions for
using the enthymeme and the Toulmin model in the classroom; most of
these suggestions were devised and tested by the trial-and-error of
my own teaching experiences.
I. ARISTOTLE AND THE "NEW" ENTHYMEME
Before we examine the enthyraeme as it is understood by Aristotle
and presented in his Rhetoric, it may be useful to begin with the ul
timate goal of the entire treatise. William M.A. Grimaldi suggests that
that goal is "...an analysis of the nature of human discourse in all
areas of knowledge" (1). Rhetoric, then, would encompass the commu
nicative aspects of medicine, ethics, politics, science, and all other
fields of inquiry while also existing as a distinct discipline in itself.
However, it is the "nature of human discourse" that distinguishes
Aristotle, for he would say (as Grimaldi does) that that nature incor
porates the whole person. That is, Aristotle is primarily concerned
with establishing an inseparable connection between the rational and
affective components of human communication. If we accept that this
relationship is at the heart of Aristotelian rhetoric, then the enthy-
meme--as the main instrument of rhetorical argument—comes to occupy
a central role since it incorporates the interplay of reason and emo
tion in persuasive discourse (Grimaldi 16).
But is the enthymeme actually the main instrument of rhetorical
argument? Aristotle himself says so in the Rhetoric. "Everyone who
effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or
examples: there is no other way" C1356b, Roberts translation). This
quote acknowledges that there are two, and only two, forms of rhetor
ical proof. "Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration The ora
tor's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the
most effective of the modes of persuasion" (1355a). Not only does this
passage indicate that the enthymeme is more effective than the only
6alternative form of proof (the example), it carries within it the logi-
cally-derived conclusion that the enthymeme is persuasion. Of course,
I do not mean to prove the centrality of the enthymeme by means of
such a loose syllogism; I only wish to make clear a relationship that
pervades Aristotle's rhetoric: a relationship between the enthymeme
and Aristotle's entire rhetorical system.
Not only is the place of the enthymeme set down by Aristotle him
self, most rhetorical scholars also agree on the singular importance of
the enthymeme to Aristotle's rhetoric. That the enthymeme is the basic
unit of all persuasive discourse is, however, about the only thing
that these same scholars agree upon. Ironically, twenty-five centuries
after Aristotle, a canonical definition of the enthymeme has yet to be
established despite the efforts of philosophers, logicians, and rhetori
cians. The question is; Why not? Or: What, specifically, about the
enthymeme is so elusive?
Perhaps the primary reason why the mystery of the enthymeme is
still unsolved lies in the fact that Aristotle himself does not define
the enthymeme in the Rhetoric in such a way that his understanding
of it is made clear. Given that the enthymeme is so central to Aris
totle's overall rhetoric, this ommission is both surprising and per
plexing; but, depending on one's perspective, this "mistake" could be
construed as either a tragedy or a happy accident. On the one hand,
we may never know with absolute certainty what Aristotle intended the
enthymeme to mean; but, on the other, this ambiguity has led scho
lars to think about the term in new and interesting ways, and their
findings may be more valuable to us than even Aristotle's intentions.
A second reason to explain why the enthymeme remains somewhat
ambiguous is the fact that scholarly inquiry about the enthymeme is
relatively recent. The enthymeme was essentially a dead and forgotten
issue over the past two millenia because it was dismissed as merely
a form of the syllogism. In his RhetoriCt Aristotle refers to the enthy
meme as a "rhetorical syllogism" (1356b); rhetoricians, it seems, were
content to call it a syllogism without investigating the implications of
the adjective "rhetorical." This enthymeme-as-syllogism concept re
mained unchallenged for centuries until Lane Cooper, while working on
his translation of the Rhetoric in 1932, noticed that not all of Aris
totle's enthymemes were syllogisms with one of the three premises sup
pressed or omitted. In the field of logic, however, the enthymeme is
still considered a form of the syllogism.
Cooper's discovery points to a third explanation for our difficul
ties with the enthymeme: critical interpretations of Aristotle are most
often based on translations of the original Greek text. Languages, of
course, do not translate without shifts in meaning, and some meanings
do not translate at all. This may help explain how Nancy Harper, in
examining the original Greek texts of the Rhetoric and the Prior Anct-
lytics, inductively identified ten different definitions of the enthymeme
used by Aristotle (304). While some dismiss Harper's findings on the
grounds that the enthymeme can only be defined deductively and then
applied a priori (Poster), Harper's work does illustrate W.D. Ross's
conclusion that a "completely consistent theory of [the enthymeme's]
nature" cannot be drawn from the passages in which Aristotle dis
cusses enthymemes (Ross 499). Ryan adds his voice to this choir
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when he notes that, when translated, Aristotle's examples of enthy-
memes do not fit our current theories about its nature; he argues that
we should mold our theories to fit his examples, not vice-versa (19).
The final possible reason that I will offer here to explain our
inability to define the enthymeme is the fact that there are exceptions
and inconsistencies inherent in every potentially defining characteris
tic of the enthymeme. Controversies rage over such debates as form
versus function, induction versus deduction, contingency versus abso
lutism, logic versus affect, and others. I will investigate some of
these debates only inasmuch as they serve my ultimate purposes here,
but the point may still be made that these conflicts over translations
and interpretations have helped to obscure the importance of the en
thymeme. One of my tasks here is to investigate these conflicts in
such a way as to reveal the significance of what I take to be a very
important rhetorical concept.
While examining these critical controversies about the enthymeme,
I will be heeding the advice of three other scholars. Carol Poster, in
arguing for the need for an etymology of the enthymeme, suggests that
The model of the enthymeme as a term possessed of a unique para-
phraseable meaning irrespective of context is not only problematic in
light of a general notion of how natural language functions, but also
depends on an oversimplification of its history" (8). Hence, I will
acknowledge that the enthymeme may not have a meaning that is fixed
and outside language. This endeavor will attempt to arrive at a mul
tidimensional and flexible understanding of the enthymeme—an under
standing that, according to Wayne N. Thompson, gives the enthymeme
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a broad definition consistent with its practical persuasive function.
Thompson, in fact, argues that we do not need a definitive conception
of the enthymeme, the search for which has only resulted in scholarly
failure (76). Finally, I will attempt to arrive at a workable con
sensus about the enthymeme, the absence of which James C. Raymond
cites as one of the reasons why classical rhetoric has been neglected
in today's writing classroom. We cannot possibly have clarity in our
textbooks as long as confusion and disagreement reign in the schol
arly journals (Raymond 150).
The Enthymeme and the Syllogism; Form Versus Function
When Aristotle calls the enthymeme a "rhetorical syllogism" in
the RhetoriCj he does not clarify whether he meant to base the con
nection on a formal or functional level. Until recently, the enthymeme
had been commonly defined only by its formal difference from the syl
logism, and textbook writers were content to describe the enthymeme
as a syllogism with one of its premises suppressed. By so defining
the enthymeme as merely another form of the syllogism, it is easy to
see how the importance of the former could be obscured and neglected.
One of my goals here is to recast the enthymeme as a second form of
deductive reasoning apart from the syllogism, so that the enthymeme
may have a life of its own, outside logic, in the field of rhetoric.
Asyllogism is a formal logical construction that illustrates de
ductive reasoning. That is, it joins two known propositions (called
"premises") to arrive at a conclusion containing "new" knowledge
(although scholars disagree about the epistemological implications of
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deductive reasoning). Here, for instance, ia Aristotle's famous example
of a syllogism;
Premise 1: All men are mortal.
Premise 2: Socrates is a man
Conclusion; Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
If we recast this reasoning into an enthymemic form, the result is:
"Since Socrates is a man, he must also be mortal."
In the enthymeme, the general principle expressed in the first premise
Of the syllogism is left unstated.
We can be satisfied with the idea that the enthymeme is a kind
of syllogism if we do not ask why one of the premises of a syllogism
might be suppressed in the enthymeme. But I believe that the answer
to that question is critical in proving that the enthymeme deserves a
place of its own in rhetorical theory.
The answer is to be found in the way that humans naturally
reason; that is, we do not usually argue with one another or write
persuasive discourse with syllogisms; instead, we use enthymemes. Our
minds may reason syllogistically on some level that we may not be
aware of, but the expression of that reasoning is a natural act. As
John Mackin so curtly put it, "no one, with the exception possibly of
a logician, consciously does any suppressing of anything whatsoever
When engaged in deducing conclusions" C122,. Even on those rare
occasions when we are aware of the syllogisms in our heads, we leave
he obvious premises so that we do not risk insulting the intelli-
restricting formal structure.
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If the connection between the syllogism and the enthymeme is a
formal one, and if all syllogisms can be expressed as enthymemes, it
would logically follow that all enthymemes could be expressed in syl
logistic structures. However, this is not the case. Many enthymemes
can be restated as syllogisms, but many others cannot. For example,
suppose I say to a friend: "Take your umbrella with you because the
weatherman forecasted rain for later in the day." I base this enthy
meme on the unexpressed premise that my friend and I agree that the
weatherman in question is a reliable forecaster of the weather. No
one is arguing whether it will or will not in fact rain later in the
day; I am merely using a practical enthymeme for a persuasive end--
which is to convince my friend to take an umbrella with him. The
inferential process may be formally deficient, but the enthymeme is
materially valid. Consequently, I believe that meaning should be the
test of an argument's validity, not its form of external expression.
James McBurney and Lloyd Bitzer seem to agree that external form
is not the defining quality distinguishing enthymemes from syllogisms.
McBurney argues that enthymemes usually lack one or more of the
propositions of a syllogism, but this is not a necessary condition of
the enthymeme. In fact, he suggests that a three-part syllogism drawn
from probable causes and signs (rather than necessary ones) is an
enthymeme regardless of whether or not a premise is omitted (67). For
Bitzer, the critical distinction between the syllogism and the enthy
meme is based on how their premises are secured and what their goals
are. Dialectical syllogisms are those in which premises are asked for
in order to achieve criticism; enthymemes are rhetorical syllogisms in
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which the premises are assumed by the rhetor in order to achieve
persuasion (405). Though these two scholars draw different distinc
tions between the syllogism and the enthymeme, both would be likely
to agree with my belief that defining these terms strictly by their
forms would be to understate the importance of their functions.
Many other scholars have taken sides in this debate between the
form and the function of rational constructions, and a few of them,
like Richard Lanigan, have attempted to bridge the gap. According
to Lanigan, most hypotheses that attempt to decribe the enthymeme
fall into one of two camps: the enthymeme as a syllogism that is for
mally valid but materially deficient since it uses signs or probabili
ties instead of absolutes; or, the enthymeme as a syllogism that is
materially valid but formally deficient since one or more premises are
unexpressed. As a synthesis, Lanigan defines the enthymeme as "an
incomplete syllogistic form embodying the matter of signs and proba
bilities" (207-209). We will take up the matter of signs and proba
bilities in a later chapter, but the fact remains that Lanigan is still
concentrating on form as a defining quality of the enthymeme. His
choice of words is inadequate in my view because the enthymemic form
is neither incomplete nor syllogistic; I would replace both words with
the terra "deductive."
Jesse Delia is even more concerned with form than Lanigan. With
the principles of cognitive communication theory firmly in mind, Delia
implies that the syllogism has more persuasive potential than the en
thymeme because of the formal distinction between them, a distinction
he illustrates with a syllogism:
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Now if the rules of logical form correspond with the operation
of the mental processes and if the form of the discourse cor
responds with the rules of logical form, "reasoned discourse"
results and "reason" is conveyed directly to the mind of the
listener. Since form conveys reason directly to the mind of
the receiver, an argument cogently laid down according to the
rules of logical form inherently has the power to direct the
human cognitive process, i.e., to persuade. The effectiveness
of the reasoned argument is thus dependent on the form in
which it is expressed--the nearer it comes to meeting the
rules of logic, the more persuasive it will be. (140-141)
I will not deny that the human mind operates according to extremely
logical forms (in fact, I have already stated that humans reason syl-
logistically although they are not naturally aware of it), but I chal
lenge Delia's notion of what persuasion is. For Delia, persuasion is
io^os-centric and an argument's persuasive appeal is measured by its
adherence to the forms and rules of logic. I am more inclined to buy
Aristotle's idea of persuasion, in which the affective components of
the human mind are just as important as the rational. If politicians
and advertisers have anything to teach rhetoricians, it is that infor-
nial—and often non-rational—arguments are more persuasive than dry
logical forms. The syllogism in the opening of Delia's passage, for
example, I found to be rationally sound but not persuasive.
Although Aristotle himself called the enthymeme a rhetorical syl
logism, I think we can safely substitute the term "deduction" for syl
logism because it seems that this is the spirit of the enthymeme as it
is used throughout his Rhetoric. That is, Aristotle does not appear
to be equating the enthymeme with a rigid logical structure as much
as a general form of deductive reasoning. In the field of logic, there
is no difference between form and function, while there clearly is one
in the field of rhetoric. This departure highlights the different aims
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of logic and rhetoric: the goal of logic is demonstration; the goal of
rhetoric is persuasion. To call the enthymeme a "syllogism" highlights
the form of the reasoning over the function and the purpose; and, as
we shall see later, there is more to Aristotle's understanding of the
enthymeme than the number of its propositions and its shape. To con
sider the enthymeme as a deduction also serves to clarify its dispu-
tedly oppositional relationship to the inductive example.
The Enthymeme and the Example: Deduction Versus Induction
The controversial relationship between the enthymeme and the
example merits further discussion here. Once again, Aristotle's own
writings in the Rhetoric serve as a springboard for scholarly debate:
I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example
a rhetorical induction. Every one who effects persuasion
through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or exam
ples: there is no other way....When we base the proof of a
proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction
in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that,
certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct
proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invari
ably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthy
meme in rhetoric. (1,2,1356b,4-18)
Evidently, Aristotle is drawing clear parallels between the enthymeme
and deductive reasoning, and between the example and inductive rea
soning. This raises several questions: Is it valid to draw such clear
relationships as these? Can we assume that enthymemes are always
deductive? For that matter, can we assume that arguments from exam
ple are always inductive?
To answer our first question: no, it is not valid to lay down an
oppositional relationship between deduction and induction. The truth
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is that they are two sides of the same rational coin—the relationship
is more accurately defined as complementary. Here, for instance, is
an argument from example:
Example 1
Example 2
Example 3
Example 4
Conclusion
Plato is mortal.
Aristotle is mortal.
Gorgias is mortal.
Isocrates is mortal.
Therefore, all men are (probably) mortal.
This is an inductive argument because it reaches a tentative con
clusion about all men in general based on a set of particular facts.
I can now use that inductively-derived conclusion as a major premise
of a deductive enthymeme, which moves from general to specific:
"Like all other men, Socrates is (probably) mortal."
If I wish, I can now use the conclusion of this deduction as another
example for the above induction or for a different argument based on
examples. As you can see, there is a kind of rational cycle between
inductive and deductive reasoning. It has long been known that the
major premises of deductions were derived by induction, but I think
that the examples used in inductive arguments can often be arrived at
deductively. Therefore, it is inaccurate to claim that deduction is the
opposite of induction; likewise, the enthymeme is not the opposite of
the example.
Sally Raphael argues that the enthymeme is an inductive form of
argument rather than deductive, but her reasons for doing so differ
from mine. To begin, Raphael defines the enthymeme as a syllogistic
argument from probabilities; that is, they begin with major premises
which are generally true instead of the absolutely true or necessarily
true premises of syllogisms. Then, assuming that the essential feature
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of deductive arguments is that they are logically conclusive, and,
since most enthymemes cannot reach necessarily logical conclusions,
Raphael consequently concludes that enthymemes are not deductive.
If a form of argument is not deductive, it must be inductive (160).
I disagree with Raphael on two grounds. First, based on the
cyclic relationship between deductive and inductive reasoning that I
highlighted earlier, I do not accept Raphael's assumption that any
argument that is not deductive must be inductive, or vice-versa. We
cannot make such a clear either/or distinction. Secondly, I agree
with Eugene Ryan's argument that a deduction with a probable major
premise and a probable conclusion is, in fact, logically conclusive.
If one accepts the premises, one has no choice but to accept the pro
bable conclusion (17). Consider the following syllogism:
Major premise: "Most Italians are Catholic." (probability)
Minor premise: "Antonio is Italian." (fact)
Conclusion: "Therefore, Antonio is probably Catholic."
"Probably" is the .key word here; if we accept the premises, we must
also accept that Antonio is probably Catholic, even though he may not
be Catholic in reality. Thus, the syllogism is logically conclusive.
While Raphael maintains that all arguments are inductive, it is
also possible to argue that all arguments are deductive, based on a
controversial passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric:
Enthymemes based upon example are those which proceed by
induction from one or more similar cases, arrive at a gen
eral proposition, and then argue deductively to a particular
inference. (II,25,1402b,15-10)
Although this passage indicates that the example can be a form of the
enthymeme, I think such an interpretation misses Aristotle's point. I
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believe that Aristotle is stating here the very thing I stated earlier:
examples beget enthymemes beget examples (i.e., the potentially end
less cycle of reasoning).
I called the 1402b passage quoted above "controversial" because
it seems to contradict the oppositional relationship between the enthy-
meme and the example laid down by Aristotle in Book I. The problem
can be resolved by a different translation of the original Greek text.
In Book I, "example" refers to a form of inductive argument; while in
Book II, it refers to one of four sources of enthymemes. James C.
Raymond would substitute the term "paradigm" to mean an inductive
argument, because that term more closely signifies the patterns of in
ference which constitute inductions (145-147). Raymond, of course, is
assuming that our use of one term ("example") to represent two dif
ferent concepts is the source of our confusion; and I believe that the
assumption is valid.
The conclusion I wish to draw in this section is that the enthy-
meme is primarily a deductive form of rational proof. We cannot say
absolutely that all enthymemes are deductive; nor does this fact de
mand that we label enthymemes inductive. Having established that a
rational cycle exists between deductive and inductive arguments, I
call the enthymeme primarily deductive because its external expression
to an audience-not its internal generation in the rhetor-is what I
take to be the distinguishing criterion. That is, the audience recei
ving an enthymeme will identify its premises and process their logical
relationships by beginning with the general and working towards the
specific-regardless of whether the rhetor works from the general to
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the specific or from the specific to the general to the specific. Thus
far, I hope to have shown that the enthyraeme is an expression of
natural reasoning, primarily deductive, used for persuasive ends.
The Bnthymeme and the Topoi
Given that deductive arguments are perceived by an audience to
work from general principles to specific conclusions, it would be easy
to surmise that enthymemes are typically drawn from common topoi (or
"topics") rather than specialized ones. For Aristotle, "common topics"
refer to generalized lines of argument which can be used in almost
any subject; "special topics" denote particular and material topics
belonging to a specific discipline, such as mathematics or medicine
(Kennedy 46).
Aristotle's Rhetoric contains several passages which seem to favor
the common topics as the primary source of enthymemes. "[Nlone of
the arts theorize about individual cases... [which are] so infinitely
various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible" (1,2,1356b).
Aristotle cites medicine as an example, which is concerned not with
individual cases but with what will help a given class of patients.
If this is true of all disciplines, then the enthymemes which seek to
argue about a class of subjects must be drawn from the common topoi.
"A statement is persuasive and credible because it is directly
self-evident.... ERJhetoric draws upon the regular subjects of debate"
(1,2,1356b). It seems natural to me that these "regular subjects" do
not deal with specific disciplines; and so rhetoric, as a discipline in
itself which also has a place in all other disciplines, would utilize
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the general lines of argument, or common topics. Also, I believe that
it would be difficult for an enthymeme drawn from special topics to be
"self-evident." Those statements that we deem self-evident are usually
of a general nature and accepted by almost everyone. It is important
to keep in mind that Aristotle was concerned with the nature of human
communication in all arts; arguments based on specialized topics move
further away from pure rhetoric and nearer to the disciplines with
which they deal.
If we agree that a rhetorical discourse usually has as its audi
ence a group rather than an individual, then Aristotle's passage has
practical implications as well. First, enthymemes derived from common
topics will be more easily understood by a diverse group because the
premises will be sufficiently general and probable for everyone in
that group to understand. Secondly, enthymemes with general premises
will be more likely to touch on the shared assumptions of a diverse
group than specialized ones. And thirdly, arguments from general
premises are more likely to be self-evident. Critics may accuse me of
confusing generalized premises with general lines of argument in my
conception of the topics; however, I feel that the above implications
are applicable for either view of the topics.
Once again, however, Aristotle seems to contradict himself in a
later passage in his Rhetoric: "IWel must know some, if not all, of
the facts about the subject on which we are to speak or argue. Other
wise, we can have no materials out of which to construct arguments"
C1396a). Assuming that we can substitute the word "enthymemes" in
place of "arsuments"-and I think we can-this passage seems to im-
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ply that one who does not know the specific facts of an issue cannot
conduct a rhetorical discourse since he or she does not possess the
necessary knowledge to construct enthymemes. This much appears
obvious, but others may counter that a sophist—who only pretends to
know the truths involved in an issue—can still draw on a ready store
of commonplaces as a source of enthymemes. Aristotle counters in 1396b
that such enthymemes can be readily identified as lacking in specific
knowledge of the subject. Enthymemes based on special knowledge are
far more persuasive than those based on commonplaces; and such
sophistic enthymemes are more likely to fall under Aristotle's nine
categories of sham enthymemes.
Although Aristotle differentiates rhetoric from other disciplines,
he nevertheless admits that "Most enthymemes are, in fact, based upon
these particular or special Lines of Argument [sic]; comparatively few
of the common or general kind" (1358a). This seems to present us
with a contradiction between theory and practice: enthymemes should
be drawn from common topics, but are actually drawn from special
topics usually. What, then, are we to do? Should we change our
practice to fit the theory or should we change our theory to fit the
practice? James H. McBurney suggests that a kind of compromise
position is necessary:
In other words, while rhetoric as a science is concerned
generically with those broad principles of probability which
can be adduced to lend cogency to an argument in any
tield, and, as a methodological science, cannot be expected
to be conversant with the special topics of the various
substantive fields with which it deals, nevertheless it is
nnoofKf" fu speaker be as thoroughly informed aspossible in that particular substantive area in which he
chooses to speak. (61)
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Ultimately, given the complex web of relationships among the var
ious disciplines and the dynamics of modern audiences—who know more
facts about more topics~we must content ourselves that the premises
of enthymemes today cover the entire spectrum, from the most general
to the most specific. Since we cannot make such clear distinctions
today as Aristotle did between the common and the special topics, we
cannot claim the specificity level of the premises as a distinguishing
feature of enthymemes. Since enthymemes are based on the general
assumptions of a given audience, we must look to the context of the
rhetorical situation as the determining factor of the sources of enthy
memes. That is, the specificity of the audience addressed determines
the specificity of the topic level of the enthymemes used by a rhetor.
The Enthymeme and Contingency, Kairos, and Context
An important question logically follows from the previous section:
From where are we to draw our enthymemes, if not the topics? The
answer to the question is rather straightforward, but only if we first
take the time to make clear distinctions between syllogistic absolutism
and enthymemic probability. Afew words about and context
will also help to resolve this problem.
"For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and
all our actions have a contingent character... It is evident, therefore,
that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes... will .ost of
them be only usually true" I,2,:357a,. This passage could
be construed as Aristotle-s admission of the obvious: events do not
happen in a vacuum. Enthymemes dealing with our context-bound
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actions must somehow deal with the specific elements of that context
in which our actions are situated, such as time, place, culture, etc.
While enthymemes can be formed from the "necessary" propositions of
most formal syllogisms ("John is an American citizen because he was
born in Maryland"), most of what we argue about depends on contin
gent matters for which there is no truth in the absolute, platonic
sense: cause and effect, courses of action, assessments of value, etc.
To illustrate, we cannot argue about whether or not Bill Clinton is
president, but we can argue about whether he is an effective one.
Other scholars, however, have taken Aristotle's passages on the
contingent nature of argument to make a case for probability as a
feature of the enthymeme which might distinguish it from the syllo
gism. In the context of rhetoric, a probability is a proposition which
is generally true and generally approved of by an audience. While
Aristotle may have defined the enthymeme as a syllogism based on
probabilities (in the Prior Analytics)—in which probability becomes
the key distinction—he also recognizes that there are some necessary
signs which may serve as the basis of enthymemes. We find this in
passages of the Rhetoric which deal with fallible and infallible signs,
which we may also call, respectively, probable and necessary (1357b).
I think we can rule out probability as a defining feature of the
enthymeme for two reasons. First, since we argue about contingent
matters and not facts (a fact in dispute is not a fact at all), our
enthymemes characteristically make use of non-absolute knowledge.
Since all arguments take place within contextual boundaries, it is
only appropriate that our enthymemes take thoae contexts into account.
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Enthymemes usually have their basis in probable knowledge, but it is
not a rule or requirement that must be maintained. I support Thomp
son's assertion that rhetors should use whatever enthymemes they feel
would best serve their persuasive ends, probable or absolute (69).
A second reason for discounting the value of probability in any
definition of the enthymeme is that it assumes that absolute proposi
tions exist with which probabilities may be contrasted. I do not mean
to digress into a lengthy epistemological argument, but, in our pre
vious discussion of induction and deduction, it was shown that the
general premises of deductive arguments are derived inductively. The
question then becomes: How often do inductive arguments arrive at
conclusions which are absolutely and necessarily true? The answer
is "very rarely": "There are few facts of the 'necessary* type that
can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms" Rhetoric 1357a). Also:
How will we know for certain if our inductive conclusions are abso
lutely true, even if we perceive them to be? Mudd says we cannot:
With each new piece of information we have gathered, the
older authoritative generalizations have become more and
more suspect. Very rarely, the argument goes, do we find
a case where perfect induction is possible. Lacking this,
any generalization we make will necessarily be tentative.
The most we can hope to know is what is probable. (411)
Consequently, I believe that almost all deductions are based on prob
able knowledge regardless of the form those deductions take, syllo
gistic or enthymemic.
I submit that an enthymeme is a valid form of deductive argu
ment drawn from premises which are accepted by an audience as being
true, whether necessarily or probably. To do so, however, invites
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yet another controversy; universal premises are required if a deduc
tion IS to be valid, but we have just rejected the value of such uni
versal, absolutist propositions. This trap is rather easily sidestepped
in light of Mudd's distinctions between probable universal propositions
and particular absolute propositions:
Admittedly, a statement qualified by "many" or "most" is no
longer a universal, but it is not one whit less absolute for
such a qualification can make a statement absolutely true.
Thus, on the altar of material truth we sacrifice the prob
able universal in favor of the particular absolute. The
conclusions we call "probable" are themselves absolute and
not probable at all. (Mudd 412)
We can illustrate Mudd's distinctions by recalling our "Antonio"
syllogism from an earlier section. The laws of deductive logic require
that one reason from a universally true premise, such as "All Italians
are Catholic." This major premise is a universal, but it is also not
materially valid; we cannot use it to construct the enthymeme "Antonio
is Catholic because he is Italian." But if we change the universal
premise to a particular one by qualifying it, we make it materially
true: "Most Italians are Catholic." We still cannot logically conclude
that Antonio is Catholic, but we can validly conclude that Antonio is
probably Catholic. Hence, we should not be concerned in our deduc
tions with what is universally and absolutely true.
Now we may return to the original question which began this sec
tion: From what sources are we to draw the enthymemes for our argu
ments? Since all human actions have what Aristotle calls a "contingent
character," it follows that all enthymemes that seek to persuasively
direct those actions must be drawn from the contingencies of the situ
ation rather than universally absolute propositions. These contingen-
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cies are made up of the variables involved in an issue's situational
context, or kairos. Since the kairos of every argument will be unique,
it is these situational variables that are likely to contain the crucial
issue of the argument as well as the best strategies for arguing it.
James L. Kinneavy defines kairos as "the appropriateness of the
discourse to the particular circumstances of the time, place, speaker,
and audience involved" (84). In this light, kairos may be considered
synonymous with "rhetorical situation" or "situational context." But
this conception falls short for my purposes because it involves only
the elements involved in an argument's delivery; it does not take into
account the significant variable of the argument itself. I believe that
if we combine this notion of kairos with the status doctrine, then we
arrive at the ultimate source of the most effective enthymemes. This
observation may sound strange since neither "kairos" nor "status
doctrine" are particularly Aristotelian terms. However, I never claimed
that Aristotle alone provides us with all we need to know about the
enthymeme; in fact, Aristotle does not explain the enthymeme very
clearly at all. But if the two terms were in use in his time, I feel
he may have made the same observation as I have made here.
Generating successful enthymemes is now a two-step procedure.
First, we employ the status doctrine to determine the key issues under
dispute in any case. One of the values of the status doctrine in the
invention process is that it identifies what a rhetor needs to discover
based on the conflict between his knowledge and the knowledge of
others. After discovering the essential issue or conflict, the rhetor
can then create and adapt enthymemes to fit the rhetorical context.
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The Enthymeme and the Speaker-Audience Relationship
Although a speaker is responsible for taking all of the variables
of a rhetorical context into consideration, the audience of an argu
mentative discourse is by far the most important determiner of that
argument's ultimate goal and overall shape. This is not to deny the
speakers their authority over the texts they create, nor do I wish to
suggest that writers simply mold texts to pre-determined argumentative
forms. What I am suggesting is merely what scholars of Aristotelian
rhetoric have long believed;
[T]he speaker or the writer today has, as in the past, one
4- of the truth prevail in the mindsand hearts of his audience, by means of words, composed
"f} speech or in writing. His aim is communication, not self-expression. (Clark 49)
One of the embedded assumptions in Clark's passage is the idea
that rhetorical discourse, as communication, is very much like a con-
versation-a two-way interchange of thoughts, feelings, and ideas.
As such, rhetoric itself cannot exist without both a speaker and an
audience, and neither party is more or less important than the other.
We know that such things as actions, reality, and truth do not exist
in vacuums, but Delia argues that even pure logic itself cannot exist
independently of an audience (141). Therefore, it would be foolish for
a rhetor to conceive of an argument without considering his or her
audience and then expect that resulting argument to be effective.
The second assumption voiced by Clark is one that many other
rhetorical scholars believe to be true; that a consideration of the
rhetorical dynamics of audience is the most significant and most dis
tinguishing feature of Aristotelian rhetoric. Consequently, the enthy-
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meme, as Aristotle's key rhetorical device, must be an audience-
specific argumentative tool. To our developing definition of the enthy
meme, we should therefore add this feature; but first we must deter
mine the relationship between the audience and the enthymeme.
"We must not, therefore, start from any and every accepted opin
ion, but only from those we have defined—those accepted by our
judges or by those whose authority they recognize" (.Rhetoric 11,22,
1396a). This passage comes from the chapter in the Rhetoric that
contains Aristotle's suggestions for how we should construct and use
enthymemes. I cite it here because it indicates that the audience
is critical to the invention process. We do not pull enthymemes out of
thin air; we begin by determining what "our judges" believe about
the subject of our argument. Having determined that, we then build
enthymemes out of those prevailing beliefs and assumptions or we mold
our enthymemes to suit them. In my mind, the terra "judges" calls
up an image of a-courtroom, which in turn summons the attendant
metaphor of an argument as a trial. If we imagine the ways in which
a lawyer adapts his line of questioning to persuade his chosen target
audience, the jury, it should become clear what Aristotle means here.
The critical implication of this idea is that it requires of the
speaker a knowledge of the audience to be addressed. Before we can
invent an enthymeme to make our arguments suit an audience's pre
dispositions, we must first analyze our intended audience to determine
what they know, what they believe, what they value, and what they
will accept, among other things. Since they are the "judges" of the
efficacy of our arguments, what they believe will, to some extent, be
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more important to our enthymeraes than what we may wish to persuade
them to believe.
Lloyd F. Bitzer argues that a speaker who wishes to use enthy-
memes must engage in a kind of implicit dialectic with the audience,
not only to discover what its members collectively believe, but also to
include them in the communicative act:
To say that the enthymeme is an "incomplete syllogism"...
means that the speaker does not lay down his premises but
lets his audience supply them out of its stock of opinion
and knowledge.... Whether or not premises are verbalized is
of no logical importance. What is of great rhetorical impor
tance, however, is that the premises of enthymeraes be sup
plied by the audience. (Bitzer's italics, 407).
John T. Gage seems to agree with Bitzer*s implicit dialectic as the
means by which rhetors find the mutually agreeable grounds on which
to build enthymemes, but his view seems to involve a closer working
relationship between speaker and audience:
The enthymeme cannot be constructed in the absence of a
dialectical relation with the audience, since it is only
through what the audience contributes that the enthymeme
exists as such. It is, in one sense, a necessary compro
mise between what one who wishes to persuade may want
to say and what an audience will allow to be said. But
it is, in another sense, an adjustment of what one who
wishes to "discover the means" of persuasion knows to what
is known by others. (157)
As you can see, Gage is less confident of the audience's ability to
supply the desired preraises than Bitzer. I find Gage's compromise
idea to be more in tune with the spirit of rhetoric as communication.
Even though we may accept that enthymemes are constructed from
the beliefs and assumptions that are understood as givens for a par
ticular audience, and even though we may accept that enthymemes are
somewhat self-persuasive since they are formed from premises supplied
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by the audience itself, we must still learn bow to conduct this dia
lectic and compromise before we can make use of these concepts in the
creation of enthymemes. It helps to begin with the idea that enthy-
memes consist of two types of propositions; premises—which are shared
by both speaker and audience--and conclusions—which are not shared.
Therefore, the speaker should pull premises from his own store of
knowledge and opinion and then, after having engaged in audience
analysis, test those premises on the audience to see if there exists
the necessary agreement to prove the conclusion. This is the "dia
logue." Compromise occurs if the speaker finds that the agreement is
not there; then, he or she must adapt the original premises to take
the audience's differences into consideration.
For example, suppose that a friend and I disagree as to which
baseball team would be most likely to win the next World Series. He
claims that the Chicago White Sox will be the next world champions
while I argue for the Atlanta Braves. Hence, we have different con
clusions at the outset. In order to engineer his acceptance of my
conclusion, I would identify the premises I am working under and ask
myself whether or not my opponent (the audience) would agree with
them. Those premises are: 1) the team with the best pitching has the
best chance to win the championship, and 2) Atlanta has the best
pitching. Since my friend is very knowledgeable about baseball prin
ciples generally and the character of various teams specifically, I
can be fairly certain that an enthymeme would be effective if it were
so stated: "The Atlanta Braves will win the next World Series because
they have the best pitching staff."
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But what if I am arguing the same issue with a different audi
ence—a Chicago Cubs fan who, like most Cubs fans, maintains a fer
vid loyalty to his team that cannot be swayed by such a rational
argument as the one that worked so well for the White Sox fan. He
may agree to the same premises as the White Sox fan, yet not accept
the conclusion. Under the rules of syllogistic logic, this is imposs
ible. However, enthymemes are not syllogisms, and the fundamental
difference between their goals is analogous to the difference between
logical demonstration and persuasion. Returning to the Cubs fan, I
now find it necessary to develop an enthymeme on a different premise,
an assumption he will accept as given: "The Cubs will not win half
of their games, let alone the World Series, because that would be out
of character." Although this enthymeme does not prove my conclusion
as much as it disproves his, I can at least be fairly certain of this
level of agreement.
The case for Jthe enthymeme as potentially the strongest rhetorical
device is bolstered by new research in cognitive psychology. Jesse G.
Delia suggests that arguments received by an audience are evaluated
by that audience through both rational and affective frameworks based
on their own internalized knowledge and values (143). Arguments that
do not harmonize with those internalized frameworks are perceived as
illogical, unacceptable, or simply nonsensical. The test of a premise's
validity, then, is not whether it is logically derived or logically con
nected to other premises but whether or not the audience will simply
accept it. This is based on the tendency of rational people to accept
most readily the conclusions of their own premises (Delia 144-147).
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The upshot of this discussion of the role of the speaker—audience
relationship to the enthymeme is that it is not just recommended but
necessary for the speaker to analyze, or "know," his or her audience
and to construct enthymemes that are appropriate to that audience.
That is, the rhetor's aims must work with the audience's assumptions,
Effective speakers consciously construct enthymemes from the assump
tions that are shared by an audience and then present those assump
tions in a manner that allows the members of that audience to reach
the speaker s conclusions on their own—to allow them to participate
in their own persuasion. Bitzer lends added authority to this view:
[Elnthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly
produce them. Because they are jointly produced, enthymemes
intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the
strongest possible proofs. Owing to the skill of the speaker,
the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is
persuaded. I believe this is the reason Aristotle calls
enthymemes the "substance of rhetorical persuasion." (408)
Obviously, we are not talking about attaining agreement in just the
strictly rational sense; many scholars would support my claim that
affective assention is equally important to successful enthymemes—
perhaps even more so.
The Enthymeme and the Pjgteis
In Book I, chapter 2 of the Rhetoric, Aristotle introduces his
three modes of artistic proof, which are often referred to as the "pis-
teis" by rhetoric scholars or "Aristotle's rhetorical triangle" by com
position teachers. These include appeals to the speaker's character
(ethos), appeals to the values, beliefs, and emotions of the audience
ipathos) f and the rational appeals of the speech or argument itself
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ilosoB). The good rhetor must be adept at all three modes of proof
for if true persuasion seeks to effect the whole person, as Grimaldi
suggests, then reason alone is not enough. Clearly, then, if the en-
thymeme is central to Aristotle's idea of persuasion, he cannot have
meant it to be a mechanism of logic alone. If the enthymeme were
simply a truncated syllogism, one could construct proofs based solely
on a scientific, certain, and platonic form of knowledge that is uni
versal to all people in all situations. But such is not the case with
the contingent matters we habitually find ourselves discussing with
contextually bound, thinking and feeling audiences. Aristotle under
stood, even in his time, that only in an ideal world are people moti
vated by reason alone. "The enthymeme brings together the logical
and psychological reasons which convey meaning to an auditor, and
thus Aristotle recognizes that person speaks to person not only with
the mind but with the emotions and feelings as well" (Grimaldi 17).
To say that the enthymeme, like its deductive cousin the syllo
gism, is a mechanism of rational proof is again to highlight the form
and obscure the function. It is true that the premises of an enthy
meme often share a logical connection between themselves and their
attendant conclusions, but, on their own, these propositions may also
contain ethical and pathetical elements. Consider the following:
1) "Since Bosnia could be the Vietnam of the 90's, we must
not commit American troops to the civil war there."
2) "Convenience stores should be prohibited from displaying
and selling pornographic magazines to protect our
children from exposure to such indecent materials."
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3) "Having served in the U.S. Army for over three decades,
I've found that women are unfit for the military."
4) You should wear Nike Air Jordana because you should
want to be like the world's best basketball player.
These enthymemea cannot be recast into syllogistic form, but they do
reaaon deductively from varioua general principles that the audience
is likely to accept as true. But what is more important to my point
here is that these premises have values and beliefs embedded within
them; they are not just statements of fact or opinion. Enthymemes 1
and 2 are primarily appeals to pathos: the first appeals to the audi
ence's fear of reliving the horrors of Vietnam; the second appeals to
the belief of parents that children should never be exposed to pornog
raphy at any cost. Enthymemes 3 and 4 are primarily appeals to
ethos-, the third appeals to the idea that a life-long soldier has the
authority to make judgements in military matters; the fourth appeals
to the authority and personality of Michael Jordan, as well as our
culture's tendency to value its sports heroes and elevate them as role
models for our children.
While most scholars over the past two thousand years have been
guilty of categorizing the enthymeme as a logical structure of rational
proof. Miller and Bee claim that "the effective component inherent in
the enthymeme is the essence of Aristotle's concept of the enthymeme
as practical reasoning" (their italics; 201). We can logically demon
strate our arguments to an audience, but this does not guarantee per
suasion. The speaker achieves persuasion by motivating the audience
to accept his or her conclusions, which requires both reasoning and
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desire. Miller and Bee look to the etymology of the word "enthymeme"
to further support their claim—"t/jymos" meaning "soul, spirit, feeling
and thought" (201). They also look to the Rhetoric for indications of
the primacy of the affective in persuasion:
Aristotle states that "persuasion may come through the
hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions." Aristotle's
emphasis on persuasion in relation to hearers permeates
every sinew of the body of the Rhetoric and helps to expli
cate the relationship between pathos and persuasion and
thus between pathos and the enthymeme as the "substance
of rhetorical persuasion." (Miller and Bee's italics; 211)
I value the arguments presented by Miller and Bee because they
provide persuasive voices to refute the notion of the enthymeme as a
logical device. However, I do not wish to swing to their affective
extreme any more than I would wish to accept the rational extreme.
The enthymeme is the unifying structure in Aristotelian rhetoric; it
draws its persuasive power from the pisteis as a whole. We cannot
draw clear distinctions between each of the three modes as they are
used in enthymemes because all three are received and processed by
an audience using the same psychological system (Delia 147) but are
interpreted differently by the individual members of that audience.
Many scholars today also accept that the enthymeme incorporates all
three forms of proof (Conley, Gage, Grimaldi, Raymond).
Conclusion
By now it should be apparent that the enthymeme is a rhetorical
concept that eludes and resists any attempts to positively identify its
necessary features. All scholars who have sought to define the term
along the spectrum of issues involved here have found themselves re-
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butted and criticized by other scholars—and I am sure this attempt
will be received no differently. However, I do feel that my venture
here differs significantly from previous scholarship in that I have
attempted to identify its characteristic, not its necessary, features;
and I have attempted to identify as many of these features as I pos
sibly could. My reasons for doing so I must attribute largely to
Wayne N. Thompson.
Thompson suggests that any "characterization of the enthymeme
should be multidimensional." The enthymeme has several important
features and our discussions of the term should take all of these fea
tures into account. Thompson also argues that the search for the
essential feature of the enthymeme is unnecessary and has only led
scholars into trouble. This may be true, but I feel that the search
for these essential features has at least resulted in much of the new
knowledge we now have about the enthymeme as well as our admission
as a discipline that a positivistic definition is impossible. Finally,
Thompson posits that any definition, of the enthymeme must be broad
enough to be consistent with its persuasive function, and so he calls
the enthymeme "any deductive argument employed to further the com
municator's persuasive ends" (68-77). Even if this "definition" is in
harmony with Aristotle's intentions, I feel it is too simplistic to be of
any practical value for scholars, teachers, and, most of all, today's
students.
Based on the research contained in this chapter, I have arrived
at a conception, not a definition, of the enthymeme that identifies its
primary, not necessarily essential, qualities so that we may have a
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working understanding of what an enthymeme is—a description that we
can work with in our libraries and our classrooms:
The enthymeme is a functional expression of natural rea
soning, primarily deductive, which is formed in response to
contextual situations and deals primarily with probable
knowledge. It is formed from the shared assumptions of the
speaker and the audience and may draw its appeals from
all three elements of the piateis.
We will look at the pedagogical implications of this conception of
the enthymeme in chapter 3, but, before we move on to Stephen E.
Toulmin's model of argumentation, it would be helpful to bring in
Nancy Harper and her findings to serve as a bridge here. Though
the enthymeme has no set form like the syllogism. Harper has nonethe
less identified three types of propositions which operate within an
enthymeme: 1) an observation, 2) a generalization, and 3) an infer
ence (306). While this is probably the order in which people reason
and not a formula, I will nonetheless lay out one of the fundamental
enthymemes driving this paper in that order:
1) Since the enthymeme xa central to the overall theory and
practice of Aristotelian rhetoric and 2) because modern com'
position claaaea focua mainly on Ariatotelian rhetoric, 3)
composition classes would be best served by featuring the
enthymeme and/or a modern version of it.
The first element, the observation, serves as the grounds for my rea
soning. The second element, the generalization, is the assumption
that I believe my audience shares with me. The third element, the
inference, is the conclusion which I have reason to believe my audi
ence does not accept at the outset.
Toulmin, by way of his model of argumentation, will rename and
expand on these three elements as the "data," the "warrant," and the
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"claim," respectively. Toulmin will not only recast Aristotle's enthy-
meme into modern terms, he will also incorporate it as a fundamental
rational process working within epistemology, cognitive psychology,
social constructionism, modern argument fields, and the recent move
ment towards the "informal logic" that has been gaining in popularity
since the 1950*s.
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II. TOULMIN AND HIS MODEL OF ARGUMENTATION
Stephen Edelston Toulmin is a philosopher who is primarily con
cerned with human rationality and reasoning processes. He is neither
a rhetorician, a psychologist, nor a communication theorist, which
may explain why his work has not received the attention it deserves
outside of philosophy. Another reason may be that Toulmin himself
never claimed an interest in rhetorical theory until late in his career
when he was made aware of the importance of rhetoric to his own
ideas about philosophy (Foss 88).
Today, over three decades after the publication of The Uses of
Argument (1958), we still do not have what may be called a compre
hensive Toulmin rhetoric. There are many reasons for this, but I
believe that the primary reason is that Toulmin's model of argumen
tation has not been reevaluated in light of recent scholarship about
the enthymeme. Many scholars (Cooley, Mancias, Trent) dismiss the
Toulmin model on the grounds that it is nothing more than a glorified
syllogism. Toulmin himself talks about syllogisms and Aristotle often
in his writings, but, strangely enough, the word "enthymeme" never
appears—even while he attacks the syllogism with an "informal logic"
that is enthymemic in nature.
My connection between recent scholarship on the enthymeme and
the Toulmin model may, I believe, present us with the long-awaited
key by which we might unlock the potential of Toulmin's ideas for
rhetorical theory and pedagogy. Such is the driving force behind this
entire thesis. Having established a working conception of the enthy
meme, this chapter specifically will present the multiple dimensions
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of the Toulmin model to illustrate its enthymemic nature. To this end,
we will examine Toulmin's overall rhetorical philosophy and episte-
mology, his informal logic, the social nature of claims justification,
his concept of argument fields, the role of the audience in argument,
and the utilization of the pisteis within the Toulmin model. I will
often refer to the previous chapter in order to show that the Toulmin
model is not a new take on the syllogism, but rather a modern refor
mulation of, and expansion on, Aristotle's enthymeme. Central to this
goal is an understanding between the readers and myself that the
enthymeme is a rich and useful rhetorical tool that has less in com
mon with the syllogism than was previously acknowledged.
Philosophical and Epistemological Background
Many of Toulmin's philosophical ideas—especially his "rhetorical"
ones—grew out of a fundamental rejection of Cartesian philosophy. He
cites Descartes' separation of the "observer" from the "world observed"
as the source of a 300-year trend favoring universal principles and
absolute certainty and a rejection of probability (Cosmopolis 167).
What followed was an era of analytic thinking (the Enlightenment)
which featured the syllogism as the model of cognitive reasoning; this
analytic mode still pervades the sciences today. Analytic rhetoric
favored Plato's ideal formal logic in which claims are grounded in
universal abstracts to deductively arrive at decontextualized universal
truths. The most troubling problem with syllogistic reasoning is that
it cannot produce new knowledge—the conclusions can go no further
than the truths contained in the premises. This tradition of analytic
A2
thought, I believe, helps explain why the enthymeme was so neglected
until recently. The new scholarship on the enthymeme and the rhetoric
of Stephen Toulmin are united in a common movement away from the
syllogism and formal analytic logic.
In the introduction to The Uses of Argument. Toulmin intimates
that we should return to the original purpose of logic as put forth by
Aristotle: "For him, questions about apodeixis li.e. the way in which
conclusions are to be established] just were questions about the pro
ving, making good or justification—in an everyday sense—of claims
and conclusions of a kind that anyone might have occasion to make"
(2). Formal logic, however, lost its focus over the centuries and
came to have little connection to the problems of knowledge in most
intellectual disciplines and the practical reasoning of everyday life
(Bizzell and Herzberg 1104). Toulmin developed his "informal logic"
as a means of returning logic to a concern for practical matters and
toward a more natural means of justifying claims.
For Toulmin, reasoning—and its outward expression in argument-
is primarily concerned with how people justify their actions, not with
how we make inferences:
Reasoning is thus not a way of arriving at ideas but rather
a way of testing ideas critically... .It is a collective and
continuing human transaction, in which we present ideas or
claims to particular sets of people within particular situa
tions or contexts and offer the appropriate kinds of reasons
in their support. (Toulmin's italics; Introduction 9)
This passage contains several embedded implications that are worth
exploring. One is that syllogistic reasoning is inadequate since it
usually ignores particular audiences, situational contexts, and kairos.
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A second is that reasoning is an inherently social process; we can
always rationalize for ourselves, of course, but the test of a valid
reasoning depends on whether or not we can justify our conclusions
for others. We will look at these two implications in the next two
sections, but a third that will be dealt with now is the notion that
reasoning is a way of arriving at knowledge by "testing ideas criti
cally."
Toulmin sees rhetoric as epistemic: "the means by which we know
whatever it is that can be known to whatever degree of certainty is
possible" (Secor 338). When we debate an issue, we do not just spew
forth a stream of beliefs and claims; we must answer the social de
mand to back up those claims with sound reasons (i.e. to justify our
claims in such a way that others accept them as truths). What the
individual holds as true is a belief; when others accept that belief,
it becomes knowledge. Argument; to be more specific, is the process
by which we socially construct knowledge. This idea is similar to
the Hegelian dialectic: what we call knowledge survives as knowledge
until it is challenged by a conflicting idea; the ensuing argument
results in a synthesis which we then call knowledge. This "synthesis"
may be the survival of the original knowledge, the rejection of it in
favor of the new idea, or some degree of compromise between the two,
but the upshot is that argument, as the process of justifying claims,
both produces and tests knowledge.
Although argument is a social activity, we cannot forget that we
reason as individuals; individuals arguing together make up the so
cial contexts in which discourse occurs. This is only possible if we
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acknowledge that individuals argue and reason in similar ways. To
do so is to accept, even tentatively, the claim of cognitive psycholo
gists that there exists a reasoning process common to all people. It
is my contention that the enthymeme is a manifestation of this quasi-
universal reasoning process because all argument is essentially enthy-
memic in nature—it is primarily concerned with the justification of
claims through the use of sound evidence and the shared assumptions
of an audience. And this is the same fundamental principle behind
the Toulmin model.
The Toulmin model of argument (see Appendix A), I believe, is
isomorphic with the natural human reasoning process. "Natural" is a
key word because for years the syllogism was accepted as the model
for testing the validity of reasoning. As we argued in the previous
chapter, the syllogism is an artificial construct: no one naturally
thinks or argues in categorical syllogistic form and syllogisms cannot
adequately deal with the context-sensitive contingent matters we typi
cally debate. So Toulmin developed his model with an eye towards
the ways in which we naturally reason and with another eye towards
developing a standardized schema by which arguments could be cri
tiqued and evaluated CBrockriede and Ehninger 44).
We can say, with some minor reservations, that the Toulmin model •
is "quasi-universal" because it describes the ways in which people in
all fields of inquiry may justify most claims in most situations. I am
speaking here of the basic framework and not the particular ways in
which various people utilize it. That is, we absorb and evaluate
evidence—such as statistics, personal observations, the scholarship of
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others—and combine the evidence at hand with general principles or
assumptions that serve to justify an inferential leap to a new conclu
sion. When we wish to convince others to accept this conclusion, the
conclusion becomes a claim, and we then present the evidence at hand
and apply the assumptions that we believe our audience accepts in
order to lead them through the same inferential process to arrive at
the same conclusion. This reasoning process is similar regardless of
the contextual factors involved: speaker, audience, situation, topic,
etc. Whether one uses enthymemic terms (observation, generalization,
inference) or Toulmin's terms (evidence, warrant, claim), the process
is virtually the same:
Warrant/Generalization
I
I
Evidence/Observation-—-- ——->Claim/InferenGe
Suppose, for example, that I am a meteorologist preparing a fore
cast for the evening news. I begin by examining the evidence at my
disposal: satellite pictures, radar readings, weather service reports,
etc. Suppose I notice that a cold air mass and a warm air mass are
converging over the area. By itself, this observation does not allow
me to predict rain. But once I connect the evidence with the proper
assumption—that the collision of a cold air mass with a warm one
almost always produces precipitation—then I am justified in making
the inferential leap to the conclusion: it is likely to rain. During
the newscast, the onus falls on me to justify this conclusion for the
viewing audience, and this is done by presenting the relevant evi
dence and connecting it with the appropriate meteorological principles
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in such a way that the conclugion/forecast seems plausible. That is,
I lead the audience through my reasoning process so that they may
arrive at the same conclusion as I:
Warrant; The collision of cold and warm
air masses usually produces precipitation.
I
I
I
I
Evidence: Satellite pictures XTherefore) Claim: It is
show that a cold air mass likely to rain,
will collide with a warm one
over the area.
Since Stephen Toulmin is primarily a philosopher, it would be
easy to expand further on his philosophical background, but that
would not serve my purposes here. I only hope that this section will
suffice as an introduction to the rest of this chapter. Many of the
ideas expressed in this section will be explored in more detail over
the next five sections.
Toulmin*a "Informal Logic"
Toulmin developed his model of argumentation to describe natural
and practical human reasoning. In this way, his model came to be
aligned with a philosophical movement against the restricting and
nonpragmatic nature of formal logic—a movement which is identified
as "informal logic." Toulmin rejected formal logic and its primary
device, the syllogism, as the preferred mode of reasoning for a vari
ety of reasons. For one, formal logic could not adequately deal with
the contingent and dynamic nature of real-life situations. For ano
ther, Toulmin found severe flaws in the syllogism: it can have hidden
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ambiguities (see Us^ 107-113); it can be formally valid and materi
ally false; it may be logically demonstrative but not persuasive; and
it does not produce new knowledge. Yet another problem with formal
logic is that it suffers under the weight of absolutism-a weight that
we can just as easily do without given the perpetually uncertain state
of most non-mathematical knowledge. The Uses of Arsumpnt was a
ground-breaking work because it illustrated these limitations of formal
logic while it legitimized, and provided a rhetoric for, the informal
logic that speech teachers in America found so liberating.
Perhaps the most significant excerpt in Toulmin's corpus (as far
as rhetoric is concerned) is his explication of analytic and substan
tial forms of argument in chapter 3. Toulmin breaks all arguments
into these two camps, and, in many ways, the distinctions between
them summarizes fairly accurately the momentous shift from formal to
informal logic. Analytic arguments are characterized by an adherence
to the rules of formal logic; the premises contain the information in
the conclusion, claims are grounded in universal abstracts, and form
is the criteria for evaluation. Substantial arguments, conversely,
are characterized by an inferential leap between the evidence and the
conclusion (i.e. the "premises" do not contain the conclusion), claims
which are grounded in context and probability, and substance is the
measure of validity (Foss 90-91). The Toulmin model, as a layout of
substantial argument, illustrates the shift to a more Aristotelian form
of reasoning which looks to jurisprudence, not mathematics, as the
ppropriate model for analyzing rational procedures (Uses 7-8). While
he may not have been aware of it at the time, Toulmin was, in fact.
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Table 2.1 Analytic and Substantial Argumentation Compared
Analytic Substantial
1. Idealized formal logic Practical everyday reasoning
2. Tautologous: conclusion is Non-tautologous: conclusion
embedded within premises involves an inferential leap
3. Claims grounded in universal Claims grounded in context and
abstracts probability
4. Evaluated by form Evaluated by substance
5. Mathematics as model--static Jurisprudence as model—dynamic
6. Platonic Aristotelian
7. Syllogistic Enthymemic
moving toward a rhetoric that is enthymemic in nature—although he
was certainly aware of his assaults on the syllogism (see Table 2.1)
Perhaps Toulmin's strongest objection to formal logic is that it is
too restricting and rule-bound to be of any practical value; it does
little to explain how real-world arguments actually work. Toulmin's
conception of rhetoric is more dynamic, encompassing the complexities
of context and probability, the inferential nature of reasoning, the
web of relationships among propositions, and the unstable condition of
most knowledge. Formal logic, with its emphasis on universality and
certainty, cannot reflect the the means by which we come to "know"
reality or the language we use to describe it (Secor 339). Also, since
there are so few universals to build arguments upon, Toulmin wants
to expand the realm of reasoning and logic to incorporate almost any
case where claims are supported by reasons according to some contex
tual standards; hence, the jurisprudential analogy.
The Toulmin model of argumentation reflects the jurisprudential
nature of substantial reasoning rather than the mathematical nature
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of analytic reasoning because Toulmin does not view logic as a theor
etical science with a priori laws; rather, he sees logic as a group
of practical skills and context-bound rules for successful inferences
(Abelson 333). Naturally, the formal logicians counter-attacked in
order to defend logic as a legitimate intellectual discipline. Jimmie
Trent, for example, argues that the Toulmin model is based on the
syllogism: the major premise is the warrant; the minor premise is the
evidence; and the conclusion is the claim (253). In my view, this is
a gross oversimplification which does not account for context, the
non-tautalogous inference, or much of the recent scholarship on the
enthymeme. Trent goes on to argue that one cannot construct a Toul
min model without first knowing the structure of the syllogism (255).
However, just because some syllogisms can be plotted on the model
does not justify Trent's claim; remember that some syllogisms can be
restructured into enthymemes, but the differences between them depend
on much more than external form, as was shown in the previous
chapter. I would be more likely to accept that one must understand
the enthymeme in order to construct a Toulmin model because the two
are essentially the same in both form and function.
Foss et al. interpret Toulmin's distinction between analytic and
substantial argument in a way I find troubling. They suggest that
"Inference...refers to the uses of reasons to arrive at a claim and is
the province of analytic argumentation" (90). How is this possible?
While we may use reasons to support a claim in a syllogism, the fact
remains that analytic arguments are tautologous (i.e. there are no
inference involved). Perhaps even Toulmin himself is confused on this
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point when he states repeatedly in The Uses of Argument that the
business of reasoning is retrospective justification. Nonetheless, ana
lytic arguments produce no new knowledge; to suggest that tautologous
reasoning is the means of prospectively inferring claims is to doom us
to an endless circle of knowledge that never evolves. Brant Burleson
supports this view in suggesting that any argument which does not
involve an inferential leap is not usually called an argument at all
(A-142). To argue that Socrates is mortal because he is a man is to
do no more than to state the same proposition twice. Such a syllogism
may. be logical, but one of the defining qualities of argument is its
dynamic nature--arguments, as inferences, move. Toulmin supports
this view (and contradicts his earlier statement) in chapter 3 of The
Uses of Argument:
If the purpose of an argument is to establish conclusions
about which we are not entirely confident by relating them
back to other information about which we have greater
assurance, it begins to be a little doubtful whether any
genuine, practical argument could ever be properly ana
lytic. (126-127)
Charles Arthur Willard presents the harshest attacks on Toulmin
in arguing that the Toulmin model cannot serve as an effective tool
for the analysis of arguments. His claims are that the Toulmin model
cannot represent the dynamic and complex nature of argumentative
interaction, and that it can only display arguments linguistically,
thereby assuming that arguments possess certain characteristics inde
pendent of the people doing the arguing (309). My response to Willard
hinges on my notion that the Toulmin model has two distinct purposes:
argument generation (inferring) and argument analysis. The former is
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a dynamic, interactive process involving the kind of self-contained
dialectic I argued for in the chapter on the enthymeme. The latter
involves the parsing and evaluation of the argument itself, as it is
on the printed page per se. O'Keefe clearly defines these two senses
of the term "argument": argument as a speech act is referred to as
"argument^"; argument as social interaction is called "argument2"
(121). The Toulmin diagram as a tool for analysis can only describe
argument^; the person arguing can use the Toulmin model as a means
of working out the argumentative interaction, or argument2, but the
diagram itself can only illustrate the speech act. Willard repeatedly
confuses these two senses of argument throughout his criticism of the
Toulmin model (Burleson-A 139). The process of creating an argument
is enthymemic and dynamic Cargumentg); the Toulmin diagram lays out
the argument-as-product and is static (argument^).
Toulmin's informal logic, as reflected in his substantial rhetoric
and his model of argumentation, was intended to serve as a compro
mise between the absolutism of the analytic Cartesian position and the
extreme relativism of the social constructionism that was coming into
vogue during the middle of this century. Toulmin developed his in
formal logic as a means of loosening up the restrictive nature of for
mal logic while still allowing for some objective standards of argu
ment assessment to hedge against relativism.
As intimated earlier, Toulmin ultimately rejected absolutism for
several reasons. For one, the things we typically find ourselves
arguing about everyday are grounded in the contexts of particular
situations; there are very few uses for universal, context-free prin-
52
ciples in either our academic disciplines or our daily lives. Secondly,
formal logic mistakenly assumes that concepts do not change over time
(Uses 104); knowledge rarely exists in a certain state, and we cannot
know for certain when we have achieved certainty anyway. Lastly,
absolutism cannot account for differences among argument fields; it
assumes that all communities, such as law, medicine, and science,
share a methodology of argument whose various aspects are universal
(Foss 93). While the rational process as. laid out by the Toulmin
model might be considered quasi-universal, the ways in which the
social contexts and the communities shape that process is not.
Toulmin also rejects relativism because it contains no standards.
We must have some standards for evaluating arguments or else we will
not be able to distinguish good reasoning from bad. Also, simply
because there may not be any foundations upon which knowledge is
based does not mean that knowledge changes willy-nilly. Meanings
have the potential to change at any time, but discourse communities
provide relatively stable forums in which knowledge is maintained.
Even when changes in knowledge do occur, such changes are arrived
at and conducted in an orderly manner. Lastly, the absence of uni
versal standards does not deny the existence of any standards at all.
Rather, each intellectual discipline or field sets its own standards
and agendas for evaluating arguments, and these field-dependent
standards allow for analysis and criticism while avoiding both abso
lutism and relativism (Zarefsky 202-203).
The Toulmin model avoids the pitfalls of formal logic without re
sorting to relativism. It acknowledges that there is a fundamental
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reasoning process that is similar for almost everyone, but that this
process also takes contextual variables and the differences among
communities into account. It rejects the overly formal cognitive for
mulas of deductive reasoning and the oppressive standards of formal
logic; instead, it places the emphasis on function and allows each
community to develop its own standards. Finally, it combines the
absolute and the relative by bringing together field-dependent and
field-invariant variables into one common rational framework. Since we
have already discussed at length the absolutism of formal logic and
the syllogism, perhaps we should look at the relativistic nature of
social constructionism before moving on to Toulmin's conception of
argument fields. I believe that recent scholarship on social construc
tionism has much to offer here, since I am arguing that the enthy-
meme and the Toulmin model utilize the more dynamic and socially
interactive nature of substantial argumentation.
The Toulmin Model and the Social Justification of Claims
Earlier, it was argued that Toulmin views rhetoric as epistemic
and, by extension, social. Since we do not argue with ourselves,
the knowledge-building nature of argument is inherently social, invol
ving other individuals, other communities, and even the world at
large. But regardless of the size of the parties involved, Toulmin's
view of rhetoric can be seen as a means of socially justifying belief
since it is concerned with how knowledge is established and main
tained among groups with shared interests and concerns. His concep
tion of the role of logic also fits this idea of social justification:
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"its primary business is a retrospective, justificatory one—with the
arguments we can put forward afterwards to make good our claim that
the conclusions arrived at are acceptable, because justifiable, conclu
sions" (Uses 6).
One of the values of the Toulmin model is that it illustrates how
an argument can be constructed to lead the audience through the cog
nitive process of reasoning. This means that I share Delia's assump
tion that an argument is more likely to be persuasive if it corres
ponds with the operation of the mental processes (141), but neither I
nor Toulmin share his strict adherence to formal logic. Toulmin de
signed his model as a natural alternative to syllogistic reasoning—an
alternative that reflects as accurately as possible our natural self'
justification of belief. Knowledge, however, results from the social
justification of belief; after all, we can easily justify our claims to
ourselves because our reasoning is unchallenged, but that does not
make our claims knowledge. Jurgen Habermas suggests that a claim
is not necessarily true or valid at all unless a community accepts the
claim by way of a consensual decision (6urleson-B 120).
This social process of claims justification via the Toulmin model
is much more involved than the simple three-part syllogism. One
begins by putting forth a claim which he or she believes should be
accepted as knowledge. Proving a claim requires evidence and it is
the job of the rhetor to present whatever evidence he or she thinks is
necessary to allow the audience to make the same inferential leap
from the evidence to the claim/conclusion as the rhetor did. Evidence,
however, is not comprised of the objective, Cartesian, out-in-the-world
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artifacts we might like to imagine. The information presented as evi
dence must be accepted as valid evidence by the community addressed;
if the community does not consensually agree that a particular piece
of information is valid evidence, then that information cannot be em
ployed as a unit of proof at all (Ehninger and Brockriede 100).
Next, the rhetor must base his or her argument on an assumption
(or "warrant" in Toulmin terms) which the rhetor and the audience
may use as an inference-license to make the leap from the evidence
offered as proof to the claim offered as a conclusion. This assump
tion, may justify the rhetor to move from evidence to claim in his or
her own mind, but, just like the evidence, the community serving as
the body-to-be-persuaded must accept this assumption or else the in
ferential leap will be dismissed as invalid, or unwarranted. Thus,
in some cases, the onus falls on the rhetor to provide additional sup
port for the evidence and the warrant, for it is not until the commu
nity accepts these, elements that they can be used to prove the claim—
and make it knowledge. The upshot of this complex Interaction is
that a belief offered as a claim does not become knowledge unless the
community or audience accepts both the reasoning and the means by
which that claim is justified.
This social conception of rhetoric has embedded within it a rejec
tion of the Cartesian conception of knowledge which holds that "know
ledge is information impressed upon the individual mind by some out
side source" (Bruffee 646). That all knowledge is generated and main
tained by a community and not an external world—even the evidence
we use to support our claims—is one of the central tenets of social
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constructioniam. The entire enterprise of proving that a claim should
be accepted as knowledge, then, involves socially justifying beliefs
by using as evidence other beliefs that have already been socially
justified. As a result, social factors shape the very perception of
evidence (see, for example, Winsor's discussion of the ways in which
various communities perceived evidence in the Challenger accident).
To accept that all knowledge is socially constructed is also to
accept that there are no foundations for knowledge—i.e., there is no
such thing as absolute truth. (Even Plato acknowledged that we may
not have access to the realm of absolutes even if it exists [Jacobi
281].) Thus, we cannot rely on any truly objective standards for
testing the truth or validity of our claims, evidences, and warrants.
The community decides everything. Platonic notions of validity, then,
must be ruled out as the standard by which we find "the available
means of persuasion" for a particular piece of discourse aimed at a
particular community. For Toulmin, the criteria for deciding which
evidences and assumptions would be most effective in a given case are
dependent upon contextual factors; "Given the current repertory of
concepts and available variants, would this particular conceptual
variant improve our explanatory power more than its rivals?" (his
italics; Understanding 225).
Given that there are no foundations for knowledge and that the
community decides what is and what is not knowledge, it is easy to
see how such a social approach might be construed as too relativistic.
It is not too far of a stretch to see that almost anything can be con
sidered knowledge if the community so deems. For example, if the
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community of lexicographers decided that felines would now be called
"dogs" and canines "cats," there is really no reason why the next
edition of the dictionary might not reflect this change (other than
rebellion by the populace). After all, there is no foundational reason
why a domesticated quadruped mammal that goes "meow" is signified
by the word "cat"—language is arbitrary. This example oversimplifies
the problem, of course, but it does reflect the structuralist notion
that meaning is arbitrary since the language that expresses meaning
in arbitrary as well.
Perhaps the most significant implication of this social approach
to argument is that--as with the enthymeme—the creator of an argu
ment must engage his or her audience in a kind of dialectic to deter
mine what it collectively knows, what it will collectively accept, and
the means by which it will be collectively persuaded. In short, the
rhetor must confront the community. Since the goal of a persuasive
discourse is always to change, even in some small way, another's
knowledge, policies, opinions, or some other piece of their reality,
the process of inventing arguments must be weighed heavily toward
the audience as the key contextual variable. Consequently, rhetorical
invention cannot occur in a vacuum or from the viewpoint of the rhe
tor alone; rather, it is inherently collaborative: "rhetorical invention
is an act initiated by a writer and completed by readers, extending
over time through a series of transactions and texts" (LeFevre 1).
Most persuasive discourse is, therefore, enthymemic in nature. We
do not argue about ideas that everyone accepts as knowledge; con
versely, we cannot argue about ideas without some common ground
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upon which to build arguments. Enthymemic dialectic--even if only
engaged within the mind of the rhetor—plays an important role in
socially constructed rhetoric. In engaging our audience in a kind of
dialogue, we take part in a process of exchange by which we might
establish agreements that we can consider knowledge. Naturally, we
can also discover significant disagreements, or stasis, the resolution
of which might serve as the ultimate goal of our argument. The
enthymeme is a crucial part of this process; it is a means of testing
propositions collaboratively:
It does so by affirming the knowledge that rhetor and
audience currently share and by asserting on that basis
a potential extension or application of that knowledge.
If the audience accepts that assertion, they are persuaded;
if they do not, the rhetor must modify the proposition in
terms of their response. (Clark 28)
Clark's passage helps illuminate the essential implication of this con
nection between the enthymeme and the Toulmin model: constructing
persuasive discourse is a negotiative exchange between a speaker and
the community to be addressed in which the speaker determines what
consensus is, builds onto that consensus, and adapts to gaps in that
consensus when necessary (see Appendix B).
One beneficial sidelight to this social process of claims justifica
tion, as illustrated by the Toulmin model, is the elimination of the
confusing induction/deduction dilemma that has so many enthymeme
scholars needlessly concerned. In the previous chapter, I argued that
induction and deduction are but two complementary rational processes
for which clear-cut distinctions are hard to come by. One of the many
benefits of the Toulmin model is that it can free us from such logi-
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cally linear approaches by providing a framework for justifying
claims which illustrates the fundamental rational process underlying
both induction and deduction.
Toulmin does away with the terms "induction" and "deduction"
and classifies arguments according to the acceptability of the war
rant. What we normally call deductive arguments are those which
operate on a warrant that is assumed to be accepted by an audience.
This warrant, or inference license, is employed to prove the claim—
which is assumed not to be accepted by an audience. An argument of
this type is called a "warrant-using" argument simply because its
warrant is not in question and is used to prove the claim (Uses 120).
By contrast, some warrants must be made acceptable to an audi
ence before they can be used to prove a claim. This is a preliminary
step which involves proving, defending, or establishing the validity
of the warrant so that it may then be used as an inference license.
Arguments of this -type are called "warrant-establishing" because the
goal is to gain the audience's acceptance of the warrant (Stratman
724). This is done by making effective use of backing—propositions
which support a warrant in much the same way that evidence supports
a claim. However, no one has yet argued for an inferential step be
tween the backing and warrant; that is, what "warrants" warrants in
a warrant-establishing argument? It would seem that one must use a
warrant-using argument to establish a questionable warrant; in which
case we might say that all arguments are argument-using. But to do
so would be to entertain the notion that perhaps all arguments are
deductive, and that would lead us back to the same conundrum that
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Toulmin'3 distinction sought to avoid in the first place. More useful
is the notion that the audience determines the shape of an argument.
The distinction between argument types, according to Toulmin,
depends not on the linear process of arriving at conclusions (general
to specific, or vice-versa), but on how the audience responds to the
warrant in an argument. Warrants are either used or established-
then-used in the move from evidence to claim. The distinction does
not depend on the goal of the warrant within an argument because
that never changes: to provide a valid inference bridge from the-evi
dence to the claim. We might say that any warrant which requires
backing before serving as a valid inference bridge operates within a
warrant-establishing argument, while an argument in which anything
but the warrant is challenged is a warrant-using one.
It may be argued that Toulmin's distinctions between warrant-
using and warrant-establishing arguments are just as needless and
confusing as those between deductive and inductive arguments, but it
must be admitted that an analysis of the warrant is more useful to
the overall evaluation of an argument than that argument's linear
logical form. The upshot of the Toulmin model is that it illustrates
that all arguments are enthymemic, employing an inference license in
order to move from evidence to claim. This is not just true of tradi
tional deductive arguments in which the major premise used is beyond
dispute, but also of inductive arguments using examples and instances
as grounds to establish premises. Now, however, the focus of criticism
is shifted from an analysis of logical form to an evaluation of the
function of the warrant, which is the key element of an argument.
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The Toulmin Model in Context: Arsument Fields
Up to this point, I have been arguing that the Toulmin model
illustrates a kind of universalized rational process, one that operates
in most disciplines and argumentative endeavors. This, however, does
not imply that context is irrelevant. To reduce all argumentative pro
cedures to a series of decontextualized operations would be to commit
the very same failures of the formal logicians, who abstracted logic
and reasoning from the social world in which it occurs and the social
actors who utilize it. Toulmin designed his model not only to reflect
the ways in which most people reason, but also the social factors that
shape, influence, and modify that reasoning. Toulmin's conception of
"argument fields" helps to shed some light on the role of context in
the social justification of claims.
In the previous chapter, we discussed this interactive process
called "social justification" with a significant emphasis on the role of
the "community." But what is a "community?" We know the various
duties of the community in the social approach to communication-as
judge for reasoning, as filter for evidence and warrants, as audience
addressed-but do we know how to define the parameters of this body?
In professional communication, "discourse communities" are identified
by a body of consensual knowledge, shared concerns and values, and
a set of norms and conventions. But how are we to identify communi
ties outside of the professional sphere? How do we evaluate the con
text of an argument involving a diverse, "multi-community" audience?
Toulmin developed his concept of "argument fields" as a means of
identifying the context of an argument and the ways in which that
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context shapes the overall justification process. Initially, Toulmin
defined fields by "logical type": "Two arguments will be said to be
long to the same field when the data and conclusions in each of the
two arguments are, respectively, of the same logical type" (Uses 14).
These fields were construed as intellectual disciplines by critics, and
Toulmin *9 continued discussion of fields in Human Understanding seems
to bear this out (Zarefsky 191). Each discipline—law, art, science,
medicine, mathematics, etc.—has its own body of knowledge and con
ventions for justifying their various types of claims, but sometimes it
is not so easy to determine the boundaries of a field. For example,
sociology and psychology are generally considered two distinct disci
plines, but are they so easily distinguished by subject matter and
methodology?
Later, in An Introduction to Reasoning. Toulmin attempted to cir
cumvent this problem by modifying his idea of argument fields to take
purpose into consideration: "the modes of practical reasoning we ex
pect to find in any particular field...will once again reflect the gen
eral purposes and practical demands of the enterprise under consider
ation" (200). This reformulation helps us to conceive of community
in situations that cross disciplinary boundaries. For example, the
typical hospital consists of doctors, lawyers, administrators and other
large categories of employees. Though each discipline--medicine, law,
business—operates as a distinct community within the hospital, their
shared purposes and goals within the hospital as a whole unite them
in a larger community. By making these shared purposes the unifying
factor, these various disciplines can communicate by maintaining these
63
purposes as the ultimate source of consensus for inter-disciplinary
discourse. This potential use of purpose is my idea, not Toulmin's.
Toulmin's way of thinking about purpose within argument fields
is significantly different from mine. His conception of fields is more
immediate, dealing with the purpose of the singular argument itself.
Few of us are politicians, for instance, but we do commonly argue
over such political matters as the president's latest economic policy,
local ordinances, and pending elections. Since the purpose of our
arguments in such contexts is to evaluate or effect policies in some
way, our arguments can be considered within the field of political
argument. Whether we are in the Senate or in the local coffee shop,
this political purpose places certain contextual constraints on our
arguments, such as the degree of logical formality, the standards for
evaluating evidence and warrants, and the modes of resolution
(Introduction 195-202).
The study of fields is important because every field has its own
standards for evaluating arguments. This can easily be demonstrated
by following the typical high school student through his or her day.
In geometry class, the student learns that problems are solved only
through the use of established theorems and proofs and formal proce
dures. Then, in literature class, the student finds that interpreta
tions and evaluations of poetry and novels are almost universally
justified so long as they meet with approval from the teacher. Next,
the student can perform chemical experiments and combine the hands-
on observations with scientific laws to justify previous hypotheses.
By the end of the day, the student may have encountered any number
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of argument fields in which the criteria for successful reasoning
changes according to purpose and context.
In real life, however, it is not so easy to identify the field of
an argument; we cannot tell how we should argue in a given situation
by looking at the clock. Thus, it is up to the rhetor in any given
context to situate himself in the appropriate argument field as a pre
liminary to the generation of enthymemes. This is necessary because
the field serves as a filter by which the evidences and assumptions
relevant to the ultimate purpose of an argument can be separated from
all the available evidences and assumptions. Since the social view of
rhetoric rejects the Cartesian split between the observer and the world
observed, there can be no universal standards for evaluating evi
dence; evidence can only be evaluated in terms of accepted standards
within a given field (Abelson 334).
For example, suppose a lawyer and a doctor arrive at the scene
of an automobile accident. Both will evaluate and use evidence from
the same event, but the evidence they select will be determined by
their ultimate goals and the conventions of their disciplines. In jus
tifying the claim, "John caused the accident," in a court of law, the
lawyer will note that John's blood-alcohol level exceeded legal limits
and will base his enthymeme on the legal precedent (and the jury's
accepted assumption) that an intoxicated driver is generally presumed
to be at fault in an accident. The doctor, on the other hand, is not
concerned with John's guilt or innocence but rather with his physical
condition. He will observe John and combine the first-hand evidence
with a more scientifically certain warrant to justify his diagnosis
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that John is in shock and needs to be transported to the nearest hos
pital immediately. Changing the field of an argument changes the
evidence and warrants available to .justify a claim, as well as the
standards by which that justification is evaluated (Stygall 98). Yet,
regardless of the field-dependent propositions and standards involved
in any argument, the relationships among those propositions will hold
to the fundamental enthymemic structure: observation, generalization,
inference.
What we have in Toulmin's argument fields is an attempt to join
the rational rigor of formal logic with the contextual variations that
we encounter in our daily lives. By illustrating a quasi-universal
process of claims justification and by showing how context shapes and
affects that process, Toulmin bridges the void between absolutism and
relativism. A monkey can be rational if there are no standards for
reasoning among language users; conversely, a standard calculator
can be considered rational if we disavow context in favor of formal
logic. With Toulmin's argument fields and his model of argumentation,
he redefines rationality as the ability to adapt to the demands of a
field rather than adherence to the rules of formal logic—or an out
right rejection of them (Burleson-B 114).
With his concept of argument fields, "Toulmin is searching for
ways to explain how some portions of arguments remain the same,
regardless of field, while other portions of argument vary from field
to field" CFoss 99). Given the role that context plays in argument,
it is impossible to formulate a universal, field-invariant framework.
For example, the degree of force expressed in a qualified claim does
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not depend on the field, but the criteria used to justify that claim is
field-dependent (Secor 340). Similarly, with regards to evidence, the
rules by which evidence is used to prove a claim are field-invariant,
while the evaluation of that evidence depends on the accepted stan
dards within a given field (Abelson 334). The very nature of evidence
in the Toulmin model demands that it be very specifically tied to the
subject matter, while the warrant—as a general assumption shared by
an audience—is relatively content-free. The critical distinction seems
to lie between criteria and force: "all the canons for the criticism
and assessment of arguments, I conclude, are in practice field-depen-
dent, while all our terms of assessment are field-invariant in their
force" (Toulmin's italics; Uses 38).
The Toulmin Model as Audience-Sensitive Rhetoric
After having discussed Toulmin's informal logic, the social justi
fication of claims,, and his conception of argument fields, it is easy
to conclude that Toulmin *s rhetoric places a great deal of emphasis on
the role of the audience. In fact, the audience can be considered the
most important factor within any given rhetorical context because, as
was established in the previous chapter, it is the audience who deter
mines whether or not our arguments are successful. In fact, every
thing that was established in the previous chapter regarding the
speaker-audience rela^onship in the enthymeme applies to the Toulmin
model as well, and so we will not need to repeat ourselves here.
Rather, I hope to further the case that the Toulmin model is audience
directed by discussing the model's value as a descriptive tool which
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illustrates the "audience sensitivity" of enthymemic argument. To that
end, we will look at each of the six elements of the Toulrain model
individually and show how each is shaped by the audience for whom
the argument as a whole is intended.
The claim is the contingent statement that serves as the goal of
any argumentative move. "Contingent" is a key word because we do
not argue about those things that are factual, certain, or otherwise
not in dispute. Claims are easily identified by an audience because
they state propositions that will clash with the audience's predisposi
tions in some way. Whether the claim makes a policy recommendation,
expresses an opinion or value, argues for a causal relationship of
some kind, or defines the nature of something, the claim must always
express a proposition that elicits a social demand for explanation.
Statements which are factual or self-evident are not claims because
they do not evoke the question, "Why do you believe that?" What is
or is not a claim .depends on the audience; to argue that ethanol is
a feasible fuel alternative is to express an opinion, but an audience
of corn farmers will not dispute it. There can be no argument with
out reasoned disagreement—the source of the disagreement must be
expressed in the claim along with the speaker's position. The argu
ment is neither complete nor successful until the audience accepts the
claim.
The evidence answers the social demand for proof once the claim
is given; it answers the question, "What have you got to go on?" We
have already established the anti-Cartesian nature of evidence in the
Toulmin model: evidence is only valid if the audience accepts it. To
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this, we can add that the evidence selected in any given argument
must respect the field in which that argument operates. And the last
defining criterion of evidence is that it must be specific and relevant
to the claim it purports to prove. Whether it takes the form of hard
statistical data, personal observation, expert testimony, analogies, or
whatever, the evidence must not consist of generalities, theories, or
principles.
Ehninger and Brockriede define evidence as "an informative state
ment believed by the audience and employed by an arguer to secure
belief in another statement" (100). This accurately articulates the
enthymemic process by which we generate knowledge by building new
knowledge onto previously accepted knowledge. Yet we know that
evidence is often challenged by the audience, and Trent criticizes the
Toulmin diagram because it makes no provisions for such challenges
to evidence (254). Trent acknowledges that even Toulmin never claimed
his model was complete. I, on the other hand, would argue that the
model is complete, but not fixed; that is, the six elements as they
are presented represent the six different functions of argumentative
propositions, and these elements may be diagrammed accordingly. To
answer Trent's criticism, I would suggest that "backing" statements
could be supplied and diagrammed with the evidence just as it is
with the warrant.
The warrant expresses the underlying assumption, shared by rhe
tor and audience, which authorizes the inferential leap from the evi
dence to the claim. Whereas evidence is specific, warrants are much
more general and occasionally self-evident; they often entail theories.
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generalizations, cultural values and beliefs, and common knowledge.
As was shown with the enthyraeme, the warrant contains the common
ground and shared assumptions of the speaker and the audience, and
asserts the claim on that basis. We can only discover warrants by
way of a dialectical relationship with that audience. For example^
a teenager who argues with her mother that she should be allotted a
midnight curfew because "all the other mothers let their kids stay out
until midnight" is basing that argument on a warrant that her audi
ence—her mother—is not likely to accept: "All the other mothers know
what's acceptable for me." She is more likely to win acceptance of
her claim if she bases her argument on an assumption that her audi
ence is more likely to accept, such as "A later curfew will prepare
me for the responsibilities I'll face when I go away to college."
Backing is commonly described as any statement which lends ad
ditional support to the warrant. (I would argue that backing state
ments can support- the evidence and the rebuttal as well.) Sometimes
the general assumption in the warrant is not self-evident, solid, or
accepted by some members of a diverse audience. In such cases, the
rhetor needs to make a case for the warrant—the assumption itself or
its relationship to the evidence-claim connection—because an argument
cannot stand without a firm basis of agreement. Thus, the audience
determines whether or not backing for the warrant is needed as well
as whether or not the backing and the warrant need to be expressed.
The rebuttal states the conditions under which the claim will not
hold true. This is an essential element in substantial arguments be
cause of the very nature of the contingent claims they entail. Only
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analytic arguments, by definition, cannot be disputed; a syllogism
that has a potential rebuttal is not absolute and is, then, an enthy-
raeme. Students often ask why a rhetor would want to admit that his
argument has weaknesses, and the best answer I know of is that an
argument is considered successful if it can withstand all serious ob
jections raised against it. Therefore, it is in the rhetor's best inter
ests to look at an issue from several perspectives, anticipate the pos
sible objections of the audience, and answer those objections as suc
cessfully as possible. Rebuttal statements can minimize opposition to
an argument by heading off the opponents "at the pass." Rebuttals
are never voiced if they are dealt with during the initial argument.
Qualifiers, statements which limit the strength of a claim, are
also essential to any substantial argument. An argument dealing with
a context-bound contingent matter cannot make a claim which is abso
lutely certain or universal. Most arguments have a potential rebuttal
which places limitations on the claim. Qualifiers indicate the degree
of force the writer believes the claim holds and this degree is usually
dependent on the number and the strength of the potential rebuttals.
Qualifiers also express the degree to which the audience should accept
the claim; such admissions of fallibility can protect the speaker from
undue responsibility. To return to our weather example, all meteor
ologists predict rain, but, given the unpredictable nature of weather,
they rarely guarantee rain, even when it seems imminent. By fore
casting an 80% chance of rain, they acknowledge that conditions are
favorable for rain but could change. Such a qualified claim can also
help preserve their jobs because they are never really wrong.
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Critics have raised a wide variety of objections to the Toulmin
model and 1 find it illuminating that some can be resolved by going
back to our understanding of the enthymeme. Richard Crable argues
that the backing which supports a warrant can also be challenged
and that the subsequent backing for the backing, per se, can also be
challenged; this can potentially go on ad infinitum. and accepting
all such challenges could possibly lead to an infinite regress (73).
Avoiding such a regress is a matter of discretion on the part of the
rhetor; he must analyze his audience and determine how much backing
is required to shore up the warrant. Or, to quote Aristotle, "we must
not carry Ethe enthymeme'sl reasoning too far back, or the length of
our argument will cause obscurity: nor must we put in all the steps
that lead to our conclusion, or we shall waste words in saying what
is manifest" (.Rhetoric II,22,1395b,24-26).
Jimmie Trent correctly points out that the Toulmin model is more
accessible to audiences, because it eliminates the demands of logical
rigor by emphasizing material validity over formal validity, but he
criticizes the model because it cannot demonstrate material validity
(255). I would like to ask Mr. Trent how it is possible for any argu
mentative structure or diagram to demonstrate material validity. The
very nature of material validity requires an analysis of the content
of a proposition; substantial arguments cannot be plugged into any
type of "rhetorical equation" or formula such as the syllogism. The
Toulmin model of argumentation helps to identify the important ele
ments of an argument according to function and to see how these ele
ments are related to one another. With regards to material validity.
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this is probably the best we can hope for; and the Toulmin model is
the best framework I know of for evaluating, not mathematically tes
ting, material validity. To test material validity to any formal de
gree would be to impose the very logical rigor that the Toulmin model
and the enthymeme successfully circumvent.
Clearly, the audience must be addressed in a kind of rhetorical
dialogue if anyone is to construct a successful enthymeme or a suc
cessful Toulmin construction. We should do away with such analytic
concepts as formal validity and material validity, and focus our at
tention instead on "audience validity." Since it is the audience who
decides whether an argument succeeds as a means of persuasion, we
should concern ourselves only with what the audience accepts as valid
reasoning—if the audience accepts it, it is valid (McCroskey 94).
Such a loose and flexible conception of argument validity permits us
to use all of the available forms of proof according to a combination
of audience analysis and rhetorical discretion.
The Toulmin Model and the Pisteis
In the previous chapter, it was established that the enthymeme is
a particularly Aristotelian rhetorical device because it brings together
the rational and affective components of persuasion. Likewise, the
Toulmin conception of substahtial argument also allows for greater
flexibility in terms of artistic proofs whereas analytic arguments rely
solely on logical demonstration. If the Toulmin model is a modern
diagram of enthymemic rhetoric, it follpws that it would have the po
tential to employ all three types of artistic proof—Aristotle's piateia.
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Because the warrant is so crucial to the persuasive force of any
substantial argument, Ehninger and Brockriede correctly assert that
rhetorical proofs can be identified by the general relationships ex
pressed in the warrant (105). Just as the assumption in an enthy-
meme may express ethological and pathological propositions as well as
statements of fact, the warrant too can entail any of the three modes
of artistic proof. Ehninger and Brockriede classify arguments with
logical warrants as "substantive"; arguments with ethological warrants
as "authoritative"; and arguments with pathological warrants as
"motivational" (125-126).
The warrant of a substantive argument expresses the rational/
logical relationship between the evidence and the claim. Suppose that
I am conducting a survey of Iowa farmers to see how this class of
people would respond to a hypothetical new energy bill that would
dramatically increase the production and consumption of ethanol. The
results of my survey may allow me to make the claim that most Iowa
corn farmers are in favor of the new legislation based on my evidence
that 85% of the random polling sample expressed approval of the bill.
Although it may not have been logistically possible to survey all Iowa
corn farmers, I cari nonetheless make a claim which generalizes about
the entire class based on an inference license which asserts that the
sample group is representative of the entire class.
In a similar yet significantly different example, Peter Jennings
may announce on the evening news that the Gallup organization pre
dicts that candidate X will win the next election based on their poll
results. The relationship between the poll results and the claim is
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the same type of generalization as in the ethanol example, but this
claim is supported by a different type of proof as well: "candidate X
is likely to win the election because the Gallup organization forecasts
that result." Now the warrant serves to assert the authority of the
person/group that makes the claim rather than the logical relationship
between the evidence and the claim: "the Gallup organization is (and
has been) a reliable forecaster of election results." Since the warrant
asserts the authority (, ethos) of the source of the evidence, such an
argument is called "authoritative" (Brockriede and Ehninger 51).
The third type of artistic proof-based argument, those in which
the warrant asserts a pathological reason for accepting a claim, is
called "motivational." Warrants of such arguments may express the
audiences's needs, desires, emotions, cultural values, or any other
audience-based, non-logical reason for accepting a claim. For exam
ple, we can return to a previous enthymeme: "Since Bosnia could be
the Vietnam of the. 90's, we must not commit American troops to the
civil war there." The unexpressed warrant entails the prevailing
belief of the American people that Vietnam was a terrible tragedy that
should not be repeated. Such a warrant may need additional backing
to make this cultural assumption more acceptable to the generation
of young people who did not experience the war outside of history
class. To be effective, I also think that the evidence ("Bosnia could
be the Vietnam of the 90's") needs further backing to show how the
situation in Bosnia is similar to the situation in Vietnam. The addi
tional backing for the evidence shores up the analogy while the war
rant's backing reinforces the crucial emotionally-charged assumption.
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The enthymeme and the Toulrain model both depend on assumptions
that the rhetor believes will justify his or her claims. But while the
argument as it is delivered—in speech or on paper—often leaves these
key assumptions unstated, the Toulmin diagram provides a means by
which these implied warrants are brought to light and analyzed. This
model is more valuable than most people realize because many base
their entire arguments on faulty assumptions of which they could have
been alerted had they used the Toulmin diagram as a diagnostic tool.
Dan Quayle, for instance, in his criticism of the "Murphy Brown"
sit-com character, once issued this enthymeme: "'Murphy Brown* is not
a good role model for young women today because she has chosen to
become a mother without the benefit of a father." On the surface this
seems like a plausible argument, but critics quickly pounced on what
they perceived to be the underlying warrant: single mothers cannot be
good parents. Dan Quayle did not actually say this, but the fact
that the audience .perceived this warrant to be implicit in his state
ment is sufficient to render his enthymeme invalid; his enthymeme did
not meet audience validity simply because the audience rejected the
warrant. A corollary to Anderson and Mortensen's notion that the
warrant can be persuasive in itself (149) is the idea that the warrant
can also be "dissuasive," either by voicing an invalid assumption or
by its questionable connection to the evidence-claim construct. Had
Dan Quayle made an attempt to identity the emotionally charged war
rant th&t the audience may believe exists he could have saved himself
from a great deal of criticism from women's organizations, bad press,
and late night lampooning.
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Conclusion
Chapter I was almost entirely devoted to defining, or at least
characterizing, a difficult and much neglected rhetorical term: the
enthymeme. While the Toulmin model is not a rhetorical term in need
of defining, per se, I do believe that a complete understanding of the
enthymeme is a necessary prerequisite to any attempt to appreciate
the Toulmin model of argumentation. Therefore, my responsibilities in
this chapter centered on establishing the Toulmin model as enthymemic
and not necessarily on "defining" the Toulmin model. Nonetheless, I
find it rather illuminating that the definition of the enthymeme ad
vanced at the close of chapter I could conceivably serve as a "defini
tion" of the Toulmin form of argument:
"The enthymeme is a functional expression of natural reasoning,,."
Toulmin designed his model with an eye towards illustrating the ways
in which people naturally reason in everyday situations. We do not
commonly use the analytic forms of formal logic, but rather the more
substantial methods of informal logic. And we do not do so for the
purpose of scientific demonstration, but for more functional reasons—
to get things done and to persuade people in daily contexts.
"...primarily deductive..." I was careful to include the qualifier
"primarily" because it was shown that inductive and deductive forms
of reasoning are not so distinct from each other as was once thought.
Enthymemes can be either inductive or deductive, though their exter
nal expression in argument usually reflects a deductive move. Like
wise, the Toulmin model cannot be so easily identified as deductive
because it also makes allowances for inductive-like "warrant-estab-
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lishing" arguments as well as deductive "warrant-using" ones. In
effect, Toulmin simply does away with the induction/deduction dis
tinction by shifting the analysis of reasoning from a linear move to
a more dynamic, holistic one.
.which 19 formed in response to contextual situations and deals
primarily with probable knowledge... " Toulmin developed his informal
logic, his substantial rhetoric, and his argument fields as a means of
contextualizing the abstract nature of formal logic while also allevi
ating the constrictions of arguing from absolutes. We typically argue
about specific events and phenomena within the contexts in which they
arise and to argue about them with decontextualized, absolute formal
logic accomplishes very little at all. The Toulmin model depicts the
influences of contextual factors on our reasoning and also reflects the
contingent nature of our common arguments.
"...It is formed from the shared assumptions of the speaker and
the audience and may draw its appeals from all three elements of the
pisteis. " The Toulmin model is an audience-centered form of rhetoric.
Reasoning is based on the assumptions of an audience (warrants), and
this is the model's most important element. Unlike analytic argument,
the Toulmin model allows for affective as well as rational proofs and
the key warrant can utilize whichever form of artistic proof is most
likely to serve the rhetor's persuasive ends. All of the remaining five
argumentative functions also reflect the influence of the audience on
the way an argument is constructed. This is crucial because the Toul
min model does away with the complexities of formal and material va
lidity in favor of the only true test of reasoning: audience validity.
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To sum up my observations by simply equating the Toulmin model
with Aristotle's enthymeme, however, would not do justice to either.
While both may be travelling the same rhetorical road, so to speak,
the Toulmin model makes some very significant changes to Aristotle's
device to make it somewhat more dynamic, applicable, and workable
for the rhetorical demands of the twentieth century. For one, Toulmin
averts the charge of relativism often levelled at Aristotle, who some
times seems more concerned with countering the absolutism of Plato
than with developing an effective techne. Toulmin presents a more
effective compromise between absolutism and relativism by introducing
a model of argument which illustrates both the stable nature of
rational procedures and the contextual factors which shape them.
Toulmin's conception of argument fields may also be seen as an
updating on the enthymeme. Although Aristotle did concern himself
with the methods of reasoning in medicine, law, politics, and various
other arts, it is Toulmin who expands Aristotle's brief comments into
a more complete and modern methodology for reasoning and arguing in
a wider range of argument fields according to the demands of the
present century. Much of what Aristotle says is still true today, but
we need scholars like Toulmin to adapt the classics to the needs of
modern students.
Finally, Toulmin helps us to accomplish what Aristotle cannot:
a clear and accessible pedagogy for the rhetoric classroom. Aristotle's
Rhetoric is too obscure and difficult to use as a kind of textbook; but
Toulmin, in presenting a modern rhetoric that is very much Aristo
telian, can be readily incorporated into the rhetoric and/or composi-
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tion classroom (in fact, Toulmin has published a textbook which fea
tures his rhetoric—An Introduction to Reasoning^^although the word
"enthymeme" is conspicuously absent). His layout of argument, in
particular, has innumerable benefits and uses for students who have
difficulty grasping the nebulous nature of Aristotle's rhetoric.
Now we are ready to explore these pedagogical implications,
though I feel it necessary to offer this preliminary caveat: Aristotle's
enthymeme and Toulmin's model, when combined into an effective peda
gogy, contains a wide variety of options for the teacher and benefits
for the student; however, they cannot function as a complete pedagogy
alone. Aristotle and Toulmin may serve as a major theoretical compo
nent in a rhetoric course, but they, like any other rhetorical theor
ists, need to be supplemented by other approaches, other lessons,
and the teachers' personal contributions. It would be wonderful to
think that a single approach could serve all the needs of the fresh
man rhetoric classroom, but that would not only be too idealistic, it
would also deny the greater educational value of a wide variety of
rhetorical voices.
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III. PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Now that we have arrived at a working conception of the "new"
enthymeme and have shown the Toulmin model to be a modernization
and expansion of that enthymeme; it is time to address the attendant
question: What are we, as teachers of rhetoric, to do with this new
knowledge? This is the fundamental question that will drive this
chapter, and the answers to it will flesh out the basic enthymeme of
this chapter: Because the enthymeme and the Toulmin model provide
(
rhetoric teachers with a wealth of pedagogical options and benefits,
such teachers should feature them together as a major theoretical com
ponent of their courses. To advance this thesis, I will look their
potential as an evaluative framework, as an invention heuristic, as
an organizational device, and as a diagnostic tool. Then I will look
at some of the major rhetoric textbooks to see how the field is dealing
with the enthymeme and Toulmin today. And finally, I will offer some
of my own methods for incorporating these elements into the classroom.
Before that, however, I feel that there are certain prerequisites
that students and teachers should cover before handling substantial
argument (from this moment on, the term "substantial argument" will
be used to refer to the enthymeme and the Toulmin model together).
Since the basic rhetoric course is typically made up of students who
have no prior experience with rhetoric, it would be inappropriate to
jump right into the principles of substantial argument without first
laying some groundwork.
First, students should be introduced to, or refreshed of, the pro
cess approach to writing. Not only is this the current trend of most
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writing scholars and texts, it is also necessary to see that the con
struction of substantial arguments involves a series of steps including
audience analysis, creating and testing propositions, stylistic adap
tation, and others. I will look more closely at the process of gener
ating substantial arguments a little later, but for now it is important
to note that recent research shows that an awareness of the processes
involved in composing a text significantly improves students' reading
comprehension (To-Dutka 201).
Next, students should be introduced to the fundamentals of argu
mentative discourse. In high school, most students are required to
write papers of an expository nature, such as personal essays and
term papers. Fulkerson suggests that most expository writing is argu
mentative since it often involves supporting claims with other claims
serving as reasons (436). This is not much different from Burleson's
conception of argument as "reason-giving discourse" (141). By alerting
students to the broad range of argumentative discourse in everyday
life, we may lead them to see that substantial argument has some
applicability to their own lives and majors. Hopefully, this will
increase their receptivity to the material (whereas abstract formal
logic will likely seem irrelevant to most majors).
Teachers may also find it beneficial to further divorce their ma
terial from formal .logic since it is the inability of formal logic to
relate to students' lives that accounts for its demise in the rhetoric
classroom (Stygall 95). This can be done by stressing the inferential,
dynamic, and contingent nature of real-life argumentation; that is,
teachers should introduce the enthymemic nature of argument and
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demonstrate the differences between substantial argument and formal
logic. It may come as a shock to some students that, as far as
rhetoric is concerned, there is no "Truth" in the platonic sense, or
"fact" in the Cartesian sense, or even "meaning" in the fixed, dic
tionary sense; but such concepts must be made clear before substan
tial rhetoric can be introduced.
Lastly, students must be introduced to the social nature of argu
mentation, Substantial rhetoric is nothing if not a process by which
writers and readers work together in the construction of arguments
and knowledge. Up until the time they enter the rhetoric classroom,
most students have only known writing to be a solitary process of
putting their own internal thoughts on paper for others to read. Now,
however, they must learn the conversational nature of most discourse,
especially the dialogic nature of argument and the implied dialectic of
rhetoric. This will certainly promote the necessity of audience analy
sis as well as an-awareness of what Linda Flower calls the "bounded
purpose" of writing:
Purpose in writing is always a bounded purpose. Whether
one is constrained by the assumptions of one's culture,
the material realities of the publishing industry, the de
mands of one's job, or the terms of an assignment, purpose
takes shape in a context that both demands and entices the
writer to walk into the embrace of purposes that are in
some sense not his or her own.... Forming a rhetorical pur
pose is a complex and creative act of negotiation. (292)
These, I believe, are the necessary prerequisites to the study of
substantial argument, although an overview of the basics of Aristo
telian rhetoric also seems in order. The bottom line is that the back
ground material taught depends on the overall context of the course.
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As Evaluative Framework
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the Toulmin model
could be considered "quasi-universal" because it reflects the ways in
which people in most fields justify their claims in most situations—
which is to say that Toulmin sought to illustrate the particularly
enthymemic nature of human reasoning. Now if all people reason in a
similar and predictable way, it follows that any model illustrating
this reasoning process could be used as a standardized framework for
the evaluation and criticism of arguments. This was Toulmin's goal
in developing his model; he wanted to describe a universal means of
testing ideas critically:
A main task of jurisprudence is to characterise the essen
tials of the legal process: the procedures by which claims-
at-law are put forward, disputed and determined, and the
categories in terms of which this is done. Our own inquiry
is a parallel one; we shall aim, in a similar way, to char
acterise what may be called "the rational process," the pro
cedures and categories by using which claims-in-general
can be argued for and settled. (Uses 7)
So Toulmin developed his model with one eye towards the ways in
which we naturally reason and with another eye towards developing a
standardized schema by which arguments could be critiqued and eval
uated.
The idea that the Toulmin model—and the enthymeme—describes a
rational process that is shared by everyone is significant to the basic
rhetoric course because the rosters of such courses typically consist of
students from a wide variety of fields and majors. It should be rela
tively easy for the teacher to show them that this framework has some
value for them in their personal lives and in their majors—which is
8^
usually the criterion by which students decide whether or not to take
an active interest in a course. Furthermore, if the course is cross-
curricular, the Toulmin model can serve as a springboard to investi
gate how this reasoning process is modified by the various disciplines
and argument fields.
The Toulmin model is particularly useful because it combines the
necessary elements of an argument with the contextual variations that
each rhetorical situation brings to bear on those elements. This may
be perhaps the most useful benefit of the model because it provides
the rhetoric classroom with a flexible framework and a lexicon by
which students might articulate their evaluations. Without a standard
for evaluation, it has been my experience that students have trouble
verbalizing their misgivings about an argument ("Well, it seems rea
sonable to me"; "How can you say something like that?"). After some
practice with the model—its terms and relationships—students learn to
identify problems in an argument more readily and to articulate them
in a way that makes sense for everyone in the academic community
("Dan Quayle is basing his claim that Murphy Brown is a poor role
model for young mothers on the unwarranted assumption that single
mothers cannot be good parents").
As Brockriede and Ehninger point out, the Toulmin model is sim
ple and accessible to students as an evaluative tool because it lays
out the parts of an argument spatially (47). Such a diagram helps
students by highlighting the dynamic interactions and relationships
among the various parts—including the suppressed assumptions—thus
increasing the likelihood that weaknesses will be spotted. For example
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the diagram (see Appendix A) shows how the relationship between the
backing and the warrant is analogous to that between the evidence
and the claim; it shows how the evidence-claim connection hinges on
the inferential leap as licensed by the warrant; it shows how the
strength of the rebuttal affects the degree of force of the claim as
indicated by the qualifier. It shows other relationships as well, but
the upshot is that these relationships may not be identified for evalu
ation by students if left in standard paragraph form; "the diagram
displays a connection between the sentences which is not present in
text but was tacitly understood by all participants to the interaction"
CBurleson-A 144).
These dynamic interactions among the elements of an argument are
a distinguishing feature of substantial rhetoric. Unlike formal logic,
which arrives at conclusions by way of such linear processes an in
duction and deduction, substantial rhetoric requires a more holistic
approach. Since arguments are structured around the presentation
and defense of a claim, one who wishes to analyze an argument must
begin with the claim and then examine the argument surrounding it
to see how the material in the discourse develops and supports that
claim (Kneupper 240). The Toulmin model depicts arguments holisti-
cally and shows how the propositions of an argument eventually lead
to the establishment of a conclusion/claim.
The Toulmin model can also provide a means of identifying and
categorizing logical fallacies. Richard Fulkerson presents three prob
lems with current fallacy theory: 1) It is inherently incomplete—there
is no limit to the number of ways reasoning can go astray; 2) it is
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inherently negative--it tells what errors to avoid, but not how to rea
son well; and 3) fallacies are not clearly defined and distinguished
from one another (443). The Toulmin model cannot solve all of these
problems completely, but it can help significantly. Fallacy theory
will always be incomplete, I believe, because each rhetorical situa
tion presents a new set of potential errors; but the Toulmin model can
include contextual factors in such a way that makes fallacies easier
to identify. The Toulmin model as it is does not teach anyone how to
reason correctly, but it does provide a means by which reasoning can
be tested and evaluated for correctness. The Toulmin model can also
help define and distinguish the various fallacies by relating them to
broader categories of failure in Toulminian terms. Stuart Hirschberg
does just that in his text, Strategies of Argument. Hirschberg, for
example, unites the red herring, the straw man, the ad hominem, and
others under the category of "Fallacies that result when the evidence
is not relevant to, the claim." Errors such as the slippery slope, the
either/or fallacy, and the false cause are categorized as "Fallacies
that result from unwarranted assumptions" (148-162).
Lastly, the lexicon of substantial rhetoric can serve evaluative
purposes in peer review groups. I regularly conduct workshop groups
of four or five students in which I direct the discussion of their
drafts while they provide the criticism and analysis. Before I used
the Toulmin model, I must confess that I was a rather ambiguous
director, asking questions such as "What do you think of John's argu
ment?" or "Do you agree with Beth's thesis after finishing the paper?"
Naturally, their responses to such questions were equally ambiguous.
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With the Toulmin model, I was able to ask more detailed questions
that probed into specific relationships among the parts of their argu
ments with a lexicon and a framework that all of us understood; "Do
you accept the implied warrant on which that evidence is based? How
strongly does the rebuttal undermine the force of the claim?" The
answers to questions such as these are more useful in building a
stronger argument for the next draft. In this regard, the Toulmin
model provides us all with the same playing field and the same rules
for evaluating arguments, something that most textbooks do not yet
provide.
As Invention Heuristic
Substantial rhetoric not only has valuable uses as an evaluative
tool, it also has the potential to serve as an invention heuristic as
well. Since the Toulmin model describes the essential argumentative
elements of a discourse and how they relate to one another, it easily
follows that these same elements should provide a guide for how a
sound argument is put together. Learning the rules of almost any
thing often leads to a natural learning of how to use the rules well;
the chess player, to cite but one example, first learns the rules of
the game and how the pieces move, and, before long, he or she is
able to formulate, or "invent," strategies which utilize those rules to
best advantage. The same principle applies to the Toulmin model,
and its value to the freshman rhetoric class is doubled if it can be
effectively used in both the production and assessment of persuasive
discourse.
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What I am proposing is something of an unusual idea because,
until recently, the Toulmin model was perceived as an evaluative tool
only—even Toulmin thought that reasoning was concerned with testing
ideas, not arriving at them (Introduction 9). Few rhetoricians have
conceived of the model as an invention heuristic and none that I have
encountered has yet to devote serious attention to the idea. Fulkerson
supports this observation but also notes that the Toulmin model at
least has the potential to aid invention--a potential that formal logic
does not have (446). He converts the six functions of the Toulmin
model into a heuristic for students to follow (see Appendix E); if they
answer each question well, they should end up with a series of state
ments that fulfill those six essential features:
1. What do I want to prove?- (i.e. What is my claim?)
2. What evidence do I have to support that claim?
3. What assumption could warrant my move from the
evidence to the claim?
4. How can I back up that warrant further?
5. What objections/refeuttais should my argument take into
consideration?
6. How much should I qualify the strength of the claim?
To Fulkerson's heuristic, I would add a seventh question: How much
does the intended audience know about the topic or issue? I feel that
this is a crucial question because the answer will set the level of the
argument, which must be appropriate to the level of the audience. As
with the enthymeme, the level of the audience determines whether or
not certain assumptions and facts need to be stated explicitly in an
argument; and what is not said can be just as important as what is.
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This seventh question requires that the writer engage in audience
analysis, which is a critical step in the invention process when con
structing persuasive discourse. We cannot begin to write an argument
without a very clear idea of who it is we are attempting to persuade,
what they know and believe, and what types of argument they are
likely to find most acceptable. In fact, what the audience believes
is, in some ways, more important to the overall shape of an argument
than what we would like to persuade them to believe, since it is the
audience who determines whether an argument is valid or not. Thus,
it is not just helpful, but necessary, for the speaker to analyze and
understand the audience and to construct enthymemes that are appro
priate to that audience. That is, the rhetor's aims must work with
the audience's assumptions. Effective rhetors consciously construct
enthymemes from the shared assumptions of an audience and then pre
sent those assumptions in a manner that allows the members of that
audience to participate in their own persuasion (Bitzer 408).
By illustrating this enthymemic principle of rhetoric, the Toulmin
model can help students see how important the role of the audience is
to the invention process. Similarly, a consideration of the pisteis is
intimately connected with notions of audience. Once students estimate
which types of argumentative strategies are likely to be most effective
for a given audience, they can shape their appeals to fit those stra
tegies. Toulmin's diagram allows them the opportunity to distance
themselves from their arguments and to see how their audiences are
likely to evaluate them. Students must be mindful that what they find
persuasive is not necessarily what their audiences find persuasive.
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The warrant—as the expression of an audience-held, inference-
licensing assumption--may be considered the most critical element in
the invention process. As stated earlier, the audience decides what
counts as valid evidence and valid assumptions, but it is the warrant
that serves as the foundation upon which the argumentative justifica
tion of a claim rests. Since an argument cannot be effective without
audience validity, the writer must not only be able to know what an
audience knows, but what means of moving from evidence to claim the
audience will accept.
By itself, however, the Toulmin model provides no methodology for
determining what assumptions an audience holds, but it is useful for
testing the assumptions that a rhetor eventually derives through audi
ence analysis. According to McCroskey, the Toulmin model brings
audience analysis into the invention process rather than treating it
as a discrete step. Such a combination leads students to ask the
right questions; it does not provide the right answers:
If the student speaker can learn to evaluate his resources
by beginning with his claim and then proceeding to find
the data and warrant needed to establish that claim with
his particular audience, he will determine what he needs to
know about that audience. (McCroskey 94-96)
By plotting the argument in a Toulmin diagram, the student should be
able to tell if the argument hangs together when the warrant contains
one of the audience's assumptions. Of course, I am basing this line
of reasoning on the assumption that the critical testing of our "inven
tions" is in itself implicit in the invention process.
The rebuttal in the Toulmin model is also important to an audi
ence-centered invention process because, like the warrant, it is de-
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rived almost entirely from the audience. A rebuttal anticipates the
possible objections of the audience and forces the writer to look at
the issue in question from another viewpoint. This is useful in the
classroom because too often our students argue from personal beliefs
and prejudices without considering the myriad other ways to look at
an issue. The rebuttal forces the student to place himself in the
shoes of the audience and to evaluate the persuasive force of his
argumentative move. Students will be forced to do this if the teacher
works under Toulmiri's maxim that an argument is successful if it can
survive all attacks against it. By learning to anticipate potential
weaknesses, students will learn to devise new lines of argument if the
rebuttal is strong and counter-rebuttals if the objections are not so
strong.
The enthymeme is also particularly useful to the invention of the
thesis statement and the teaching of it. An effective thesis statement
should be expressed in enthymemic form: it should present the main
claim, the primary reasons for accepting the claim, and an implied
assumption which ties the two together. The thesis of this chapter is
enthymemic in that it expresses a claim which I believe my audience
does not share with me at the outset ("Rhetoric teachers should fea
ture the enthymeme and the Toulmin model together as a major theor~
etical component of their courses..."), the intended means of arguing
for the claim and the primary reasons for accepting it ("...because
the enthymeme and the Toulmin model provide rhetoric teachers with a
wealth of pedagogical options and benefits"), and the implied warrant
which I believe my audience shares with me without question ("Any
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theoretical component which provides rhetoric teachers with a wealth
of pedagogical options and benefits should be featured in the rhetoric
classroom"). This is what Lawrence D. Green calls the "fundamental
enthymeme," and it aids the invention process by calling attention to
the "strategic necessities" that must be fulfilled before we can be sat
isfied that our main claim has been proven (625).
While it is true that the Toulmin model can only illustrate a
single inferential move, it can indicate what further argumentative
moves will be required to support the fundamental enthymeme. This
is a new twist on the old adage, "You must prove everything in the
thesis statement." That is, the fundamental enthymeme, as laid out
with the Toulmin model, spells out all of the propositions that must
be further discussed with secondary enthymemes. This is because the
thesis statement not only indicates the claim that the whole argument
seeks to prove, but also the assumptions that must be defended, the
evidences that must be proven as valid, and the rebuttals which must
be dealt with. Fortunately for me, my fundamental enthymeme only
requires that I support my means of proving the claim by specifying
what those pedagogical options and benefits are (though it may be
hoove me to show that substantial rhetoric provides quality benefits
and options for the rhetoric teacher, not just a quantity of them).
As Organizational Device
Green's fundamental enthymeme is a device that can impose the
necessary ordering of ideas that is so often missing from students'
essays. It is a means of combining the processes of invention and
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arrangement by cueing students to the materials required in an argu
ment as well as the structure those ideas should take. Unlike the
traditional thesis statement—which usually articulates an issue and
the writer's position only—Green's fundamental enthymeme "shapes the
movement of the entire discourse through its control of the overall
logical and rhetorical relations within the discourse" (623).
For example, suppose one were to write an argument in support
of the following fundamental enthymeme: "Composition classes would be
significantly improved by focusing on the enthymeme because it is
central to the overall theory and practice of Aristotle's rhetoric"—
based on the assumption that audience and writer share a belief in
the primacy of Aristotelian rhetoric in composition pedagogy. Following
Green's model, it would be necessary to first prove that composition
courses are in need of a better approach. Next, the writer must show
that the enthymeme is central to the rhetoric of Aristotle. Lastly, the
writer would have, to show that an approach based on the enthymeme
is superior to other possible solutions to the problem. Consequently,
this one enthymeme not only suggests the materials that must be in
vented to prove the claim, but also the series of logical relationships
and their arrangement throughout the essay as well.
As the title of his essay indicates, Jeffrey Porter advances a use
for the enthymeme from the reader's perspective in "The Reasonable
Reader," Porter's goal is to show how the enthymeme can organize
the reader's participation in the text (332). Porter seems to be oper
ating under an assumption--which I find agreeable--that a writer con
siders his audience before inventing an argument, but the text itself
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engages the reader directly in a kind of conversation. Subsequently,
the fundamental enthymeme can guide the reader through a text by
implying a logical and orderly arrangement—the same order which
guides the writer in the arrangement of his ideas; after all, writers
are readers of their texts too.
Borrowing froiii Green, Porter also discusses the parts of a funda
mental enthymeme as a conclusive assertion plus three requirements;
1) the question at issue, or stasis; 2) a clause that functions as the
main reason for accepting the assertion; and 3) ah assumption accep
table to a certain audience (336). But Porter goes a little further by
arguing that the dominant enthymeme controls both the rhetorical and
logical relationships within an argument by implying an ethos, sym
bolic strategies, and the premises assumed by the reader—whether the
writer is aware of the controlling enthymeme or not (332-333). Thus,
teachers should encourage their students to probe texts for these rela
tionships that are. implied by the enthymeme;
Aristotle's idea of the enthymeme can be understood as a
device for discovering connections.... If critical reading can
be defined as the art of understanding discourse, and if
discourse is determined by enthymemic relations, then I
believe we have a right to say that critical reading in
volves comprehending the inferential order of a particular
text and, further, understanding how the affective strate
gies implied by that order work to fulfill it. (Porter 336)
The Toulmin model can also aid in this enthymemic arrangement,
of course, but its terminology presents another way to organize the
material in an essay, Charles W. Kneupper argues that the model
can easily be employed as a tool to teach the logical outline (240).
By arranging propositions in a kind of hierarchy from claims down to
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warrants and finally to evidence and backing, students should be
able to see the relationships among these propositions and to test to
determine the best possible ordering of these relationships. Kneupper
suggests that such an outline might look something like this (240):
CLAIM: I, A national health care program should be
adopted.
WARRANT: A. A national program, is necessary to deal
with the magnitude of the problem.
EVIDENCE: 1. Millions of people cannot afford adequate
health care.
EVIDENCE: 2. States, localities, and charities cannot
afford to provide for so many people.
WARRANT: B. A national program is a moral imperative.
EVIDENCE: 1. The results of inadequate health care are
unnecessary death and suffering for
millions.
BACKING: 2. Failing to act to correct this problem
when we are capable of doing so leaves
us morally responsible.
As Diagnostic Tool
When Toulmin says that his model serves as a means of testing
ideas critically, he is implicitly saying that his model has diagnostic
value. Naturally, any framework that lays out arguments for analy
sis and criticism can be used by teachers to analyze the arguments
of their students. But the Toulmin model, with its spatial diagram
and its particular lexicon, allows teachers to be more specific in
their evaluations of student papers and it also provides a workable
standard that both student and teacher can use. Too often, students
complain that they do not know how their teachers go about the busi-
96
ness of evaluating their work; by using the Toulmin model as both
an evaluative and diagnostic tool, students can be made aware of
what their teachers hold as the qualities of a good argument and not
worry so much about "giving teachers what they want." The Toulmin
model can help add some standards to the traditionally arbitrary pro
cess of evaluating writing.
Substantial rhetoric provides writing teachers with a variety of
diagnostic options. For one, they can use Kneupper's outline to plot
the major propositions in a student's paper. By removing statements
from their surrounding paragraphs, teachers should be better able to
test the logical ordering of ideas and suggest better or alternative
orders. Such an outline may also be used to test paragraph unity,
assuming that every paragraph contains a claim serving as a topic
sentence and a series of facts and warrants to support that claim.
To put it another way, an outline of an entire argument can test
paragraph unity a.s well as the logical relationships among those
paragraphs.
The fundamental enthymeme can also serve diagnostic purposes.
By identifying the logical and necessary steps of an argument that
grow out of the driving enthymeme, teachers can anticipate the moves
that a student will—or should—make and also anticipate where that
student might have difficulty (Green 624). This can be helpful both
for the evaluation of finished papers and the evaluations of thesis
statements alone. Teachers can ask that students submit a thesis
statement as a first step in the writing process, then offer sugges
tions based on what that fundamental thesis demands and foreshadows.
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All teachers are required to diagnose the problems in student
papers, but the teacher who can help his or her students learn self-
diagnosis will produce the better writers. The students who simply
revise their work according to the teacher's comments will not learn
as much as the students who can revise their work based on their
own diagnoses. Substantial rhetoric can help achieve this end by
showing students that an argument is made up of a series of smaller
arguments. Every inferential move is an enthymeme, the collection of
which serve to support a fundamental enthymeme. By breaking their
arguments down into their constituent argumentative moves, and then
by plotting and evaluating these moves according to the Toulrain dia
gram, students will be better able to detect weaknesses in their rea
soning and revise them in such a way that they succeed in themselves
and in relation to the fundamental enthymeme. Fixing and improving
the parts of an argument can substantially improve the whole.
The Toulmin model also has significant self-diagnostic potential
simply because it provides another way of looking at arguments. As
Schultz and Laine point out, the Toulmin model allows students to
distance themselves from their arguments by separating the rational
moves from the stylistic filler and then plotting those moves on an
objective framework (88). This helps students to see their arguments
from a different, more rational perspective—one that is closer to the
way an intended reader might see it. This schema for self-evaluation
can help promote students' sense of control over their own writing
(Schultz & Laine 88); they can identify problems and make changes in
their work without waiting for the teacher to "pronounce judgment."
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The Textbooka
Given the abundance of pedagogical options and benefits provided
by substantial rhetoric, one would think that the current crop of
rhetoric textbooks for the writing classroom would feature the enthy-
meme and the Toulmin model as a major theoretical base. Sadly, this
is not the case. While some texts do devote serious attention to sub
stantial rhetoric, many do not. Formal logic, despite its inability to
relate to students' majors and everyday lives, still thrives in the
texts today; and those texts which do feature the enthymeme and the
Toulmin model habitually favor one and ignore the other. My review
of some of today's texts have led me to three conclusions: 1) most
texts do not reflect recent research in the study of the enthymeme;
2) most texts do not make a significant connection between the enthy
meme and the Toulmin model; and 3) a text which unlocks the enor
mous potential of substantial rhetoric for the basic writing classroom
has yet to be developed. Correcting these shortcomings has been one
of the driving forces behind the thesis you are now reading.
Many rhetoric-based writing textbooks fail to give substantial
rhetoric the attention it deserves. Miller's Motives for Writing, for
example, defines the enthymeme as a "two-part deductive argument
from which the major premise has been omitted" (109). Nothing more
is said about the enthymeme, and the section which immediately fol
lows, "Substantive Reasoning," devotes less than two pages to Toulmin
and seems to suggest that his model is a logical construction like the
syllogism. Spurgin's The Power to Persuade is not much different.
She defines the enthymeme as "a core argument, consisting of an asser-
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tion and a 'because' clause justifying that assertion" (46). She does,
however, discuss the enthymeme's potential as a thesis statement in
the spirit of Green's fundamental enthymeme. Like Miller, Spurgin
gives the Toulmin model less than two pages and, again, no connec
tion is made with the enthymeme—even though Spurgin returns to the
enthymeme immediately after Toulmin. Similarly, Current Issues and
Enduring Questions by Barnet and Bedau commit the most grievous
error of describing the enthymeme by its nineteenth century definition:
"An incomplete or abbreviated syllogism, in which one of the premises
is left unstated" (36). This text devotes more time to Toulmin—seven
pages—but relegates his model to a large appendix called "Further
Perspectives." Toulmin's lexicon is detailed and a sample analysis
of an argument is given, but, like the others, no connection is made
with the enthymeme and no diagram illustrating the dynamic relations
among the six elements is provided.
Fortunately, some rhetoric texts do rely on Toulmin's substantial
rhetoric as a theoretical base. Ramage and Bean's Writing Arguments
also conceives of the enthymeme as an incomplete syllogism, but to
this inadequate definition they have at least added the concept of the
unstated premise as drawn from the assumptions of the audience (56).
Still, no connection is made between the enthymeme and Toulmin's rhe
toric; but Toulmin, the social approach to communication, and a few
chapters devoted to audience are all fairly well handled. Teachers
and students alike may find that Ramage and Bean present the basics
of Toulmin *s rhetoric in a way that is more accessible and digestible
than even Toulmin's own Introduction to Reasoning.
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As far as tKe enthymeme is concerned, Rottenberg's Elements of
Argument is no b,etter than the other texts: the enthymeme is "a syl
logism in which one of the premises is implicit" (522). I do not mean
to keep repeating myself, but this text, like the others, says nothing
else of substance' about the enthymeme. I bring Rottenberg's text into
this survey because she features Toulmin as the major theoretical base
and uses the elements of his model as an organizing device for her
chapters:
Toulmin''s model of argument does not guarantee a classroom
of skilled arguers, but his questions about the parts of an
argument and their relationship are precisely the ones that
students' must ask and answer in writing their own essays
and analyzing those of others. They lead students naturally
into the formulation and development of their claims. (vi)
To Toulmin, she adds a concern for motivational appeals (which may
imply that Rottenberg views the Toulmin model' as a logical rubric
only) and she stresses the audience-centered approach to argument
using audience validity as the measurement of a good argument.
I
The text I had been using for several semesters, Hirschberg's
Strategies of Argument, has much in common with Rottenberg's text.
I
Hirschberg as well (and this is the last time I'll say it) defines the
enthymeme as an [abbreviated syllogism (146); and he makes no con
nection between it and either the social approach to argument or the
informal logic of Toulmin. Like Rottenberg, Hirschberg uses Toulmin
as the theoretical base, and he gives a detailed description of the
three main parts; but he puts his own mark on the model by detailing
four classes of claims, five types of evidence, and six categories of
warrants—which provide an even more thorough lexicon for analysis.
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Hirschberg also brings Toulmin's argument fields directly into a text
like no other, detailing the differences in argumentative procedures
among the fields of ethics, business, law, history, the sciences, the
social sciences, and the arts. Hirschberg also uses the Toulmin model
to classify the logical fallacies in a uniquely orderly manner.
Nonetheless, the teacher who wishes to use the Hirschberg text
would be well-advised to study and understand Toulmin's rhetoric
before attempting to teach the model to students. This text falls short
in my mind because it does not present a holistic view of the Toulmin
model. We do not get a description of how the six parts of the model
work together in the creation and analysis of arguments. The three
major parts--claim, evidence, warrant—are given individual, detailed
attention; but the three minor parts—backing, rebuttal, qualifier—are
discussed briefly and lumped under a subchapter on audience. The
author of the text seems to assume that students and teachers alike
will be able to understand the complex interactions among the parts
by studying the parts individually. Personal experience and study
has led me to believe that such a part-by-part approach cannot con
vey the web of dynamic interactions that a holistic view can. I found
it necessary to create a series of overheads that illustrate this net
work after discovering that my students consistently failed to grasp
Toulmin after reading what Hirschberg has to say. Consequently, I
feel that Hirschberg's text does not do justice to Toulmin's substan
tial rhetoric; the teacher who can make Strategies "work" is the one
who understands the Toulmin model better that Hirschberg, and can
communicate that knowledge effectively.
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The last text: I would like to call attention to is John T. Gage's
The Shape of Reason, and I mention it last because it seems to be
the only text that almost "gets it right." Gage's discussion of the
enthymeme is the only one that is current with the latest research on
the enthymeme. His delineation of the differences between the enthy
meme and the syllogism contains many of the same features that my
own multiplex "definition" articulated (on page 30). He also devotes
serious attention to the "structural enthymeme," which is similar to
the fundamental enthymeme in that it serves as a thesis which helps
invent material and guides the organization and presentation of that
material. Gage's: text is also the only text to make a direct connec
tion between the enthymeme and the Toulmin model, although that
connection is very brief and does not involve the same level of com
parison as this thesis. Gage also connects the entire pisteia to the
model, thus acknowledging that substantial rhetoric is more than o^st
an informal kind pf logic. I would recommend this text to any teacher
who makes extensive use of the enthymeme in their rhetoric class, but
the text falls short for my purposes because it does not cover the
Toulmin model with the depth and complexity that it requires.
Readers may wonder why I chose not to promote Toulmin's own
text, An Introduction to Reasoning. My primary reason for not doing
so is that it does not fit the needs of the particular environment with
which this thesis is concerned: the basic rhetorical writing classroom.
Toulmin's text is more suited to the concerns of a basic philosophy or
logic course; it does not address the written communication of the
brand of reasoning it details. Another reason is that this text makes
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no connections with Aristotle or the enthymeme—neither gets so much
I
as a mention in the entire book. And still another reason why this
text is not recommended for the writing classroom, in my opinion, is
because it does not address the wide range of important rhetorical
issues and developments as does his earlier work, The Uses of Argu
ment. Since Toulmin is not a communication theorist, a rhetorician,
a writing teacherJ or anything other than a philosopher, his ideas
can only have value for the basic writing course when given the
proper pedagogical attention in a writing text, accompanied by an
engaging and current reader, and presented by an effective and
rhetoric-oriented writing teacher.
I
^ Some Final Suggestions
Since there is not yet a current writing textbook for the freshman
rhetoric course that successfully and comprehensively features the rhe
toric of Aristotle and Toulmin in general, and their argumentative de
vices in particular, bringing the enthymeme and the Toulmin model
into the classroom places certain obligations on the teacher. First, I
would suggest that the teacher brush up on recent research on the
enthymeme and thti Toulmin model before the semester begins. Many
teachers take some sort of satisfaction in learning something along
1
with their students; trust me when I say that such an approach will
not work well here (I speak from experience). Substantial rhetoric
I
I
can be rather easy for students for grasp, but only if the teacher is
I
fully prepared and knowledgeable enough to present the material
effectively. There are no texts that will sufficiently teach the teacher
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about the massive potential of the new enthymerae and the Toulmin
model. So, teachers, read Toulmin's primary works, read Aristotle's
Rhetoric, and read the recent research on both. I will not pretend
that this thesis can serve as the only reading one needs to do to
understand substantial !rhetoric, but that was one of my goals here.
Once one feels that they have performed the necessary prepara
tions and is ready to teach, I would suggest designing the freshman
rhetoric course around [a logical progression of lectures and exercises
to teach substantial rhetoric curaulatively. For starters, one should
begin with a series of lectures that lay out the background material.
Such lectures might include the basics of Aristotelian rhetoric, the
social constructionist approach to communication, and Toulmin's philo
sophical ideas underlying his rhetoric, among others. The enthymeme
and the Toulmin model can seem quite complex and difficult without
this firm foundation. And, as I suggested earlier, it would also be
a good idea to design overheads which cover some topics that the
texts do not (some of ray own look very much like the appendices at
the end of this thesis).
Next, I would suggest using substantial rhetoric as an evalua
tive device in a series of simple sample arguments. In ray course, I
have ray students analyze a siraple text, such as an advertisement or
a newspaper editorial, to identify the primary enthymerae operating
there followed by an evaluation of the reasoning according to the
Toulmin raodel. I have found that students must first become conscious
of the enthymemes and the reasonings in others' arguraents before they
can practice using thera on their own.
105
Lastly, I have foupd significant success using a syllabus whose
material and writing assignments focus on substantial rhetoric and
progess by steps from the simple to the more complex. For example,
the first writing assignment involves a summary of a published essay;
this introduces students^ to the business of picking out the major en-
thymemes and argumentative moves that support a claim. Next, my
students write a rhetorical analysis of an essay, which attaches to
the previous assignment] the evaluation of argumentative moves using
the Toulmin model. In the third assignment, students write a simple
argument using a fundamental enthymeme and Toulmin to turn the tide
of the course towards the invention and arrangement of their own
arguments. The fourth assignment stresses the importance of audience;
here, students add stylistic elements to the skeletal argument and
learn to adapt more sensitively to the concerns of a specific audience
by using the various appeals of the pisteis. Finally, the last writing
assignment combines everything the students have learned throughout
the semester and adds an emphasis on secondary research to arrive at
a fully-developed, rhetorical argument.
While the Toulmin model and the enthymeme may seem like a God
send to teachers of freshman rhetoric, the truth is that the jury is
j
still out. Very few textbooks deal with Toulmin in any significant
way and many rhetoric teachers are still unfamiliar with him. That
I am so often asked by other teachers at Iowa State to guest lecture
on the Toulmin model is just one indication of this. Toulmin's place
in rhetorical theory and a difinitive conception of the enthymeme have
yet to be established in the field; thus, teachers are free to tinker.
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mold, utilize, and experiment with substantial rhetoric in any way
that might advance one's pedagogical objectives. Many of the ideas
presented in this chapter are the result of armchair theorizing which
are contingent upon further study and classroom use. But I must
admit that these pedagogical options and potential benefits are very
exciting to me as a teacher of freshman rhetoric.
j
It must also be no^d that I do not wish to suggest that the
Toulmin model—and substantial rhetoric in general—should serve as
the only basis for freshman rhetoric courses. It would be nice, and
very idealistic, to think that this one body of ideas could serve as
the only theory a student needs to know--9omething so simple and
flexible that all students can grasp it and springboard from it to all
other significant rhetor^al principles. But the truth is that no such
universal theory exists (yet); even the enthymeme, which rhetoricians
believe to be the main means of persuasion for the Aristotelian rhe-
i
I
toric so many of us teaj3h, cannot handle everything. Matters of tone,
style, expression, grammar, and whatnot still must be taught as if
the enthymeme and the Toulmin model were not yet developed.
However, I hope I have justified my own use of substantial rhe
toric as one of the major theoretical approaches for freshman rhetoric
courses. This was my primary goal in this thesis. I spend the lar
ger part of each semester teaching substantial rhetoric in all its di-
I
verse aspects because I . believe that the benefits of doing so far out
weigh the negatives. Because substantial rhetoric is so simple and
flexible and applicable to all fields; because it reflects the ways in
which people naturally justify their claims about contingent matters;
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because it provides a set of standards by which arguments may be
laid out, evaluated, and diagnosed; because it illustrates how writers
and their audiences "work together" in the creation and presentation
of arguments; because it can incorporate all three types of artistic
appeals; because it can serve as a multiplex heuristic strategy for
the invention of arguments; because it can be employed as an organ
izational device and diagnostic tool for both students and teachers;
because it is less complicated, less restrictive, and much more prac-
I
tical than the rules of formal logic; and because it can benefit my
self and my students in many other ways left unstated or yet unseen,
I will continue to feature Aristotle's enthymeme and Toulmin's model
in my classroom and study it as a scholar until someone can prove
to me that there is something much better out there on the rhetorical
horizon.
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APPENDIX A
SCHEMATIC OF THE TODLMIN MODEL OF ARGUMENTATION
I I
I BACKING I
I I
I iARRANT I
I I
I EVIDENCE I
I I
•>I QUALIFIER I
I I
•>l CLAIM I
1 I
CLAIM:
EVIDENCE;
HARRANT:
BACKING;
REBUTTAL:
QUALIFIER:
I
I I
I REBUTTAL I
I I
The contingent statement the writer seeks to prove; the conclu
sion put forth by the writer as the goal of the argument.
Anything the writer brings forth to prove the claim.
(Sometimes called "grounds," "support," or "data")
The underlying assumption, shared by the writer and audience,
that authorizes the inferential leap from the evidence
to the conclusion/claim.
Additional support for the assumption expressed in the warrant,
often implied and not always necessary.
States the conditions under which the claim will not hold true;
anticipates the possible objections and challenges of the
audience.
Limitations placed on the strength of the claim; indicates
the degree of force the writer believes the claim holds.
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APPENDIX B
AN EXAHPLE ILLUSTRATING THE HETBODOLOGY OF THE ENTHYMEtffi
[From "Using the Enthymeme to Emphasize Ethics in Professional Writing
Courses.," by Martin J. Jacobi. The Journal of Business
Communication. 27 (Summer 1990): 285-286.3
An enthymemic process asks students first to conduct a preparatory
analysis of the writing context to determine the shared question at issue
for themselves and their audience and to determine the assumptions they
and their audience share. They then articulate a tentative assertion that
will achieve their ends. Based on this tentative assertion they look for
adequate evidence, adequacy being determined not only by quantity and fac
tual veracity but also by the audience's attitude towards it and by the
logical relationship of the support to the assertion. This relationship is
the assumption; without an acceptable assumption, the writer may collect
an impressive body of supporting material but not persuade the audience.
For example, a writer may want to assert that he or she should be reim
bursed by a supplier, and think of including as support for that assertion
the fact that the supplier provides the writer's competitors, who have a
better distribution system, with the means to undercut the writer's prices
and so cost him or her sales and profit. While the writer may make per
fectly understandable these reasons for lost profit, he or she can come to
see, or come to be shown, that this line of development requires the sup
plier to accept the assumption that it should restrict its business acti
vity to that which won't harm the writer financially. The writer realizes
that the audience is being asked to agree to something he or she wouldn't
agree to, and, as it stands, that the written assumption is unwarranted;
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if the writer still wants to argue for reimbursement, he or she must find
support for this assumption [backing] or else find a new line of argument.
If the context provides no other means of supporting the assumption, the
writer is left with two options: to abandon the request for reimbursement,
or to produce an argument that can clearly be seen to be sophistic.
Throughout the process of enthymemic development, students should
keep in mind the prejudices and needs of their readers: Should they
qualify their claims? Do they need to rebut potential alternatives? Do
they need additional support for their assumptions and do the data and
definitions they select remain acceptable? Throughout the process of
drafting the product, students are continually confronted with the limits
of what they can say and what they are willing to say.
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APPENDIX C
A SAHPLE ARGUHENT ilTH 5CBEHATIC
The ArguDoent:
"Unless they have some kind of an understanding that no one else
knows about, it seems to me that Jim treats Betty pretty inconsiderately.
Jim often leaves Betty at home baby-sitting while he goes out drinking
with his friends, and he never even bothers to ask her if that's okay. I
mean, this is the 90's! A husband has no business leaving his wife to
spend all her evenings tied to the house and kids while he goes out with
out her."
The Schenatic:
BACKING: This is the 90's!
[Preaent-d^y understanding of
equity in gender relationahipsl
I
I
I
RARRANT: A husband has no business
leaving his wife to spend all her
evenings tied to the house and kids
while he goes out without her.
I (Value Warrant)
I
I
I
SDPPOHT: Jim often leaves >QDALIFIER: It >CLAIH: Jim treats
Betty at home with the seems to me Betty pretty
kids while he goes out I inconsiderately
drinking with his friends, I (Value C.)
and he never bothers to
ask her if that's okay.
(Personal Experience)
REBOTTAL: Unless they have some
kind of an understanding that
no one else knows about.
[From Toulmin, Stephen, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik. Introduction to
Reasoning. New York: Macmillan, 1979: 88.1
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APPENDIX D
A SAMPLE AOVERTISEHENT ilTH SCHEMATIC
Implied kernel argument in Nike ad campaign:
"You should wear Nike Air Jordan basketball shoes because
Michael Jordan wears them."
Expanded Toulmin version:
"If you're a serious basketball player, you should be wearing Nike
Air Jordan's on the court because Michael has worn them to six
NBA scoring titles and two NBA championships. Maybe you'll still
have the skills of Ross Perot, but at least you'll look like you
can play the game. *'
The argument diagrammed:
BACKING: Michael Jordan has won
six NBA scoring titles and
two NBA championships.
(Implied) lARRANT:
I
I
Michael Jordan is the best I Authority W
basketball player, and you I +
should want to be like him.I Value U.
SOPPORT:
Michael Jordan—
wears them.
(Expert Testimony)
QOALIFIER:
—>If you're a-—
serious basket
ball player.
CLAIM:
—>You should be
wearing Nike Air
Jordan's on the
court.
(Policy C.)
REBOTTAL: Maybe you'll still have the
skills of Ross Perot, but at
least you'll look like you
can play the game.
120
APPENDIX E
I
A SIX STEP HEORISTIC FOR C0NSTRDCTIN6 ARGOHENTS
Heuristic:
I. What do I want to prove?
II. What evidence do I have
to support that claim?
III. What assumption could warrant
my move from support to claim?
IV. How can I back up that warrant?
V. Mhat objections should I take
into consideration?
VI. How much should I, limit the
strength of the claim?
Example:
The Dallas Cowboya uill return
to the Super Bowl in 1994.
Dallas has the strongest combi
nation of offense and defense
in the NFC right now.
The team with the strongest
combination of offense and de
fense usually uins the NFC.
Past history of the NFC over
the last decade shous that...U.
Dallas could be plagued by in
juries or another team could
trade and draft verv well.
Hhat I claim is very likely and
is my informed opinion.
Final form: "Unless they are plagued by injuries or the San Francisco
49ers significantly improve their pass defense, it is my
informed opinion that the Dallas Cowboys will very likely
return to the Super Bowl in 1994 because they have the
strongest combination of offense and defense in the NFC. "
This argument assumes that the audience (say, readers of Sports Illus
trated) understands and accepts the warrant and the backing and so they
are not explicitly stated. As a possible seventh question, you should ask
yourself whether or not your intended audience is likely to grasp your
warrant if left unstated.
[Heuristic from: Fulkerson, Richard. "Technical Logic, Comp-Logic, and
the Teaching of Writing." College Composition and
Communication, 4 (December 1988): 436-452.]
